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Thesis

HISTORY OF THE QUESTION OF THE STRAITS

by

Emily Veronica Collins  
(A. B., Smith, "1931)

submitted in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts

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## INTRODUCTION

The following work endeavors to trace the rise and development of the Question of the Straits from the earliest times to the present day.

How could navigation of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles be regulated so as to permit freedom of navigation for all countries and safeguard their interests, and who should act as an impartial and faithful guardian? For centuries men and nations sought after the answer to this question. They employed all the arts and tricks of diplomacy, all the devices and strategies of political combinations, and all the violence of wars.

Unfortunately, the history of the problem of the Straits has not received the attention due it by historians in spite of the forceful way it has pressed itself on the Governments of the world and its consequent continuing interest for the students of history.





CHAPTER I.  
From Ancient Times to the Eighteenth Century

The question of the Straits has existed from the beginning of European states and has always shown a two-fold aspect - economic and political.

The political issue of the Trojan War was the control of the Dardanelles. (1) The Trojans controlled the Straits and demanded dues from the Greeks until Agamemnon cleared the waters for Aegean ships. Although Greek sea trade was of little importance until the battle of Salamis, it did touch at the southern ports of the Black Sea for Oriental trade and the northern ports for grain and gold. After Salamis the sea-power of Athens asserted itself, and the keynote of her policy was to hold the Black Sea route by her fleet, colonies, and dependencies. At the very narrowest point she had a colony on either side, Sestos on the Gallipoli peninsula and Abydos on the Asiatic side. Athens held this trade route by controlling the Dardanelles until Sparta in the Peloponnesian War ended Athenian supremacy by dealing a crushing defeat in the sea battle at Aegospotami in the Hellespont itself. When her grain trade was cut off, there was nothing left for Athens but to surrender.

The control of the Straits was an all important matter for the sea-going Greeks, but for the Roman Empire there was no question of the Straits until the division of the Empire

(1) Then known as the Hellespont



at the close of the third century A. D. Rome's interest in Oriental trade lay in Egypt and Syria, while her grain came from Africa and more readily accessible ports so that she had neither of the two Athenian reasons for desiring to control the gates to the Black Sea. Another fundamental reason Rome was not bothered by a problem of the Straits was that by the time she had reached them she had no rivals to exclude, for she was mistress of sea as well as land.

The center of gravity in the Empire was shifting to the Straits in 330 A. D. when Constantine founded Constantinople as a political capital and fortress. As time went on this city became an important port and commercial city - the only great port to keep alive the ancient culture during the dark ages. Its ability to do this was due not only to the strength of its walls but to its maritime strategic situation and its fleet which enabled it to control the Straits much more successfully than its armies did the surrounding provinces.

The rise of Mohammedanism in the seventh century merely increased the importance of Constantinople, for with the fall of Antioch and Alexandria, the Black Sea route gained again the significance it had held under the Greeks of the Aegean.

The trading cities of Italy, Pisa, Genoa, and Venice in the eleventh century reached Constantinople where they sought foreign merchants' privileges of marketing and of



free passage of the Straits to the ports of the Black Sea. But each city sought it solely for itself. There was no idea of an "open door" policy. These three chief rivals were at constant war. Venice struck the first master blow by directing the fourth crusade against the Greek Empire itself, and held the city from 1204 to 1261, during which time it assumed an overlordship of the Black Sea, forcing both Pisa and Genoa to accept her terms. The Genoese, however, had their revenge in helping the Greeks to regain their capital, and in receiving as reward, in addition to the confirmation of their commercial privileges, an exclusive control of the Black Sea trade. All enemies of Genoa - meaning Venice - were denied the ports of the Empire. Thus Genoa forced its trade on the Black Sea, planted its colonies on the coast, and formed a sort of colonial domin-<sup>(1)</sup>ion on the northern and eastern shores.

The Turks were the next masters of the Straits. The lasting results of their conquest were due to the gradual manner in which it was accomplished. It took them over a century to establish themselves in this region. At the end of the thirteenth century Osman I planned for himself a new sultanate, the foundations of which were laid by defeating the Greeks of Byzantium, so that he could reach the Sea of Marmora. His son Orkhan was able in a time of Greek dissension and treachery to gain practically the whole southern coast of the sea and Straits. His son Suleiman crossed the

(1) Shotwell, James T. "A Short History of the Question of Constantinople and the Straits" p. 474





Dardanelles and seized and fortified Gallipoli in 1356. From that time until the recent war the Turks held the fortifications on both sides of the Dardanelles which at this point are only about a mile in width.

For almost one hundred years after the Turks had taken the ports on the Dardanelles, the Byzantines held on to Constantinople. This was due not so much to their ability as to the general international situation which Turkish control of the Dardanelles had brought about. The Italian trading cities were now as much concerned with Turkish policy as they had been with Byzantine. Genoa in 1387 through diplomacy, and Venice by war in 1416 won from the Turks the concession of a free Dardanelles. It was not a very stable freedom, but as long as the Italians had the upper hand on the sea, the possession of the land fortifications was not enough to secure for the Turks the control of the passage.

The Dardanelles were only the first step towards gaining control of the Straits. It was at the Bosphorus that the Turks found the key to the Black Sea. In 1452 they built a formidable fort on the European side of the Bosphorus, directly opposite the one which had long stood on the Asiatic side just at the narrowest point. Here the Sultan placed heavy cannon and forbade any vessel to pass without express permission. Constantinople, thus cut off from the east and west, soon fell, and Turkish control of the Bosphorus became permanent.



However, the Black Sea remained open to Christian shipping because the Turks did not yet control the ports of the Black Sea. These ships nevertheless were subjected to the payment of tolls or annual tribute and to various harbor and naval regulations. Any ships attempting to pass the Straits without stopping were fired upon and sunk if they persisted in their refusal. The Black Sea trade was thus gradually brought under Turkish control and finally became a monopoly in 1475, when having already overrun the southern, western, and eastern shores, Turkey took Azof and Crimea thus acquiring the northern coast. Thus the Black Sea being surrounded by Ottoman territory became a Turkish lake under the sovereignty of the Sultans whose persistence in imposing restrictions on foreign ships and excluding from the Straits all ships of war caused the rule of closing the Dardanelles and Bosphorus to become a fundamental principle of the settled policy of the Ottoman Empire.

When the Turkish Empire was at its height and all Europe was turning against the Mohammedan invader, France under Francis I adopted a policy favorable to the Turk and in 1535 concluded a treaty which laid a basis for French supremacy in the Levant. France, of course, hoped to share by this agreement the advantages of Turkey's monopoly of the Indian trade, but had failed to realize the importance and value of Vasco da Gama's discovery in 1499 of a sea route to India. Thus, while the other western nations turned to the



rich profits of the sea borne trade, France reaped no such harvest from her agreement with the Turk as would have fallen to her had the world remained medieval and limited to Mediterranean channels for its outlet to the east.

The treaty of Francis I opened Turkish international relations with the states of western Europe. These dealings, known as capitulations, were treaties whereby the subjects of the signatory states acquired the right of trading with Turkish possessions and navigating Turkish waters for commercial purposes while their legal position in the Ottoman Empire was specifically regulated by an application of their personal law. This first capitulation confirmed definitely the powers of French consuls and the privileges of French residents. French ships were entitled to sail in Ottoman waters, which were denied to other states unless they acquired similar treaty rights or sailed under the French flag. In 1540 the Venetian Republic concluded the same type of a capitulation, while in 1579 England entered into an agreement which was identical with that obtained by Francis I.

Since the death of a Sultan cancelled all treaties signed by him, renewal by his successor was necessary. Sometimes the western powers were able to extend the privileges previously granted. Thus, in 1569 a commercial treaty was concluded between Charles IX of France and Selim II; in 1581 between Henry III of France and the Sultan Murad; and in 1593,

(1) Noradounghian "Recueil d'actes internationaux de L'Empire Ottoman" Vol. I, pp. 83-87

(2) Ibid pp. 146-151





1603, 1606 and 1675 the English convention was renewed. In 1597 France gained the exclusive right to the protection of all foreigners, except the English and the Venetians, within Turkish territory, and in 1604 the French capitulation was renewed at Constantinople by Sultan Ahmed for Henry IV who, despite keen English rivalry, remained the protector of the foreigners and of the Holy Places in Palestine. In 1598 and 1612 the Netherlands obtained capitulations. The former commercial treaties with Genoa were renewed and enlarged. At Adrianople in 1673 the French capitulation was renewed between Louis XIV and Mehemet IV, and additional privileges were granted. Finally in 1740 the capitulation entered into with Louis XV was made permanently binding, and served as a model for all other treaties between European countries and Turkey up to 1914.

In the eighteenth century there were a number of treaties between Austria and Turkey, but these were not capitulations and we shall look at them later. The first real capitulation between Austria and Turkey was concluded in 1718, although a treaty had been entered into in 1616 allowing Austrian merchants to trade with Turkey on certain conditions. The first capitulation between Russia and Turkey was not signed until 1783 although there had been treaties of peace in 1711, 1720, 1739, 1774 in which certain commercial privileges were granted. In the meantime other European countries obtained commercial and consular privileges:- Sweden in 1737;





the two Sicilies in 1740; Tuscany in 1747; Denmark in 1756; Prussia in 1761; and Spain in 1782; so that by the end of the eighteenth century all the Christian countries of Europe, except Switzerland and the States of the Church had signed capitulations with the Ottoman Porte.

It is essential to note here that none of these agreements, with the exception of the Russian, granted freedom of navigation in the Black Sea. The Dardanelles were opened permitting the ships of the nations to reach Constantinople, upon complying with Turkish formalities at Gallipoli and in port. The Bosphorus remained closed. The grants of freedom of trade in the capitulations with the western European countries are made in general terms and the Black Sea is not specifically excepted but the presumption was that it was not included.

An exception was made in the case of Venice for a while, until the Turks were in a position to deal with the first maritime power of the age. Thus "by special clauses in the treaties of 1454 and 1479 and by the Capitulations of 1482 and 1513, the Turks granted the Venetians the privilege of trading in the Black Sea, prior to the creation of an Ottoman marine. But this régime always had a provisional character, and with the decline of the Venetian shipping and the development of that of the Ottoman Empire, it was replaced by an absolute closure of the Euxine to foreign ships".<sup>(1)</sup>

It was not until Russia finally established itself on

(1) Shotwell p. 24 Quoted from Young "Corps du Droit Ottoman" III, p. 66 note



the northern shores at the end of the eighteenth century that Turkey was obliged formally to surrender its policy of exclusion of foreign shipping from the Black Sea.



## CHAPTER II

### The Arrival of Russia

From the end of the seventeenth century, the history of Turkey is a long story of decline. What was one of the most powerful of the Great Powers was doomed to become the "sick-man" of Europe and the objective of the expansion policy of Russia who was now about to threaten the Turkish monopoly of the Black Sea.

The position of Russia was different from that of other European nations. Possessing extensive continental territories and inadequate access to the sea, she realized the necessity of pushing her way to the coast and acquiring permanent maritime outlets. This became the definite object of Russian national policy; and to achieve it much time, money, and energy were expended.

In 1696 Peter the Great took Azov and then placed, for the first time, a Russian warship on the Black Sea. By the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699, Turkey was forced to surrender nearly all the Danube Valley (Hungary and Transylvania) to Austria; Podolia and the Ukraine to Poland; the Morea to Venice; and Azov to Russia. Furthermore, the payment of tribute by the Christian states to Turkey was stopped. By this treaty the first dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was effected, and the interminable sinister policy of intrigues and rivalries among the European Powers in regard to Turkey





was inaugurated. In 1700, Peter the Great, with characteristic energy and aggressiveness, sent for the first time an embassy to Constantinople in order to conclude a treaty of peace which was to secure for Russian shipping the right to navigate the Black Sea from Azov to Taganrog as far as Constantinople. The envoy was sent on board a Russian man-of-war, one of the squadron Peter had built in the taking of Azov, but the Turk was not to be overawed, and the Russian envoy received the irrevocable decision of the Porte that no foreign vessel should ever sail "the virgin waters of the Black Sea."<sup>(1)</sup> Thus negotiations failed; the Turk still maintained that Russian ships should not sail out of the Sea of Azov, and that Russian goods destined for Constantinople should cross the Black Sea in Turkish ships.<sup>(2)</sup>

Due to frequent inroads into Turkish territory by the Russians the Turkish government, encouraged by the intriguing diplomacy of France and Sweden, declared war against Russia in 1710. Peter was already fighting Sweden, but, heartened by his victory over Charles XII at Pultava and his acquisition of the Baltic provinces and a part of Finland, he hurried south but was defeated by the Turks and forced to sign the Treaty of Pruth in July 1711 whereby he had to restore Azov and his former conquests on the Black Sea.<sup>(3)</sup> To regain the position lost by this treaty became the determined policy of Peter's successors.<sup>(4)</sup>

- (1) Mischef, p. "La Mer Noir et les détroits de Constantinople"  
Ch. I
- (2) Goriainow, S. M. "Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles" p.2
- (3) Ibid. Ch. I, p. 1
- (4) Noradounghian Vol. I, pp. 243-253



Turkey was just as successful against the Venetian Republic in 1715 and conquered the Morea. The following year Venice concluded an alliance with Charles VI, against whom the Porte declared war. Charles, however, completely defeated the Ottoman forces and captured Belgrade. Consequently by the Peace of Passarowitz in 1718, Austria gained a territorial triumph, consolidating her possession of Hungary and securing Belgrade, the greater part of Serbia, and parts of Bosnia and Wallachia. If Charles VI had concentrated more on this war against Turkey, he might have succeeded in extending Austrian interests on the Danube and in the Balkan States as well as beating Russia in the race to Constantinople.

In 1722 Russia and Turkey coöperated in the Persian War, and in 1724 concluded a partition treaty. The Persians, in spite of the Turk's intervening successes, won a complete victory at the end of 1734. In order to keep the Turks occupied in Persia at the time of the War of the Polish Succession, Anne of Russia formed an alliance with the famous adventurer Nadir Shah giving him assistance against the Sultan Ahmed III. The latter was forced to make a peace in 1735 by which he ceded territory. In 1736 Nadir Shah was elected King of Persia.

Russia and Austria had concluded an alliance in 1726 whereby each was to aid the other in the event of a Turkish war and having come to an understanding in regard to Poland, they signed the Treaty of Vienna, 1735, which made possible a concerted attack on Turkey and a further dismemberment of her



empire. Thus Russia was afforded an excellent opportunity to wipe out the humiliation suffered by Peter the Great at the Pruth. On account of the unneutral conduct of the Porte during the War of the Polish Succession, the Tartar invasions across the Ukraine borders, and the disputes in regard to certain territories north of the Caucasus, Anne did not have to look for a "casus belli".

The immediate successors of Peter the Great finding the Straits closed to the navy of the Russian Empire<sup>(1)</sup> felt more keenly than ever that it was imperative to secure the right to pass the Straits both for warships and merchantmen; to gain possessions on the Euxine and obtain a foothold in the Crimea; to consolidate their position in the south by putting down the plundering Tartar hordes that were subject to Turkish rule; to take from Ottoman hands the control of the five great rivers: the Dniester, Dnieper, Bug, Don, and Kuban.

Preparations were therefore made for war. In January 1737 Austria joined Russia in a secret alliance; but notwithstanding this combination the Turks offered a firm resistance. By 1739 Austria was exhausted and concluded a separate peace<sup>(2)</sup> at Belgrade. During these negotiations the rest of Europe feared Russia would gain control of the Mediterranean commerce. France, through her ambassador at Constantinople, succeeded in sowing dissension between the allies and in magnifying the military preparations and resources of the Porte. All that Austria had gained at Passarowitz was now sacrificed. Russia,

(1) Goriainow, S. M. "Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles" Ch. I, p.1  
 (2) Noradounghian Vol. I, pp. 243-253







unable to continue the campaign unaided, and fearing a Swedish attack, concluded peace at Belgrade <sup>(1)</sup> later in the same month on terms proposed by the French ambassador Villeneuve. Russia was obliged to restore her conquests except Azov and its districts, the forts of which were to be destroyed. It forbade Russia to maintain or construct a fleet or other ships in the Sea of Azov or in the Black Sea and repeated the rule that all Russian commerce on the Black Sea should be in Turkish ships. This check to Russian expansion angered the Russians whose economic and military development had brought them to the shores of the Black Sea. The peace was also considered a signal victory for French diplomacy, and it was as a reward for the services of Louis XV that Turkey entered into the great capitulation of 1740.

With the accession of Catherine II, 1762, the question of the Dardanelles was attacked by Russia with redoubled energy and determination. It was she who conquered the Black Sea coastlands for Russia. The treaty of 1764 between Catherine and Frederick the Great, promising mutual aid in case of war and agreeing on the disposal of the Polish throne, alarmed the Sultan who soon found a cause for war in the actions of Russian agents who aroused the Greeks, Bosnians, and Montenegrins against Ottoman rule and in the pursuit of Polish Confederates by Russian troops into Turkish territory. The Porte, encouraged by Vergennes, the French ambassador, declared war on Russia, October 1768 - a war that was to prove

(1) Noradounghian Vol. I, pp. ~~243-253~~ 258-265



disastrous to Turkey. As early as 1769 we find Russia, Prussia, and Austria planning a partition of Poland, the dissolution of the Turkish Empire, and the establishment of a Turkish Republic.<sup>(1)</sup> Russian military progress on land was very pleasing to Catherine, and on sea she sent her fleet around Europe by way of Gibraltar in 1770 to blockade the Dardanelles and to reach Constantinople from the west - a feat it almost achieved. In the Black Sea the Russian fleet was so successful, that the European Powers became alarmed. France having urged Turkey to make war, naturally hoped for Russian defeat; England did not wish Russia to secure the passage of the Bosphorus; and Prussia was afraid of being dragged into a conflict with Austria. The continental tension was relieved, however, by the First Partition of Poland, while England was herself occupied with American difficulties. In 1773 Turkey, fearing Russian designs on Constantinople, rejected the terms for peace that were offered. She continued the struggle with resulting defeats, ending in the rout at Shumla, and was obliged to sue for peace. Catherine, occupied with the Pugachev rebellion at home ordered an end to hostilities and concluded the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardjii in 1774,<sup>(2)</sup> which although not satisfying her eastern ambitions, was one of the most advantageous transactions ever effected by Russia and marked the first great milestone in Russia's progress. Although Russia's territorial gains on the Black Sea were not

(1) Prof. Robert Lord - Lecture delivered at Harvard University - Nov. 30, 1921

(2) Noradounghian Vol. I, pp. 319-334



large, since the Tartars were merely to be freed from the Turks and made independent, still the foothold had been gained from which her conquests could be increased. In the same way a limited recognition of her rights to protect her co-religionists could later be made the excuse for an interference in Turkish affairs which alarmed other powers and led to the Crimean War. But the clause which is of chief interest here is that which opened the Black Sea and the Straits to merchant ships flying the Russian flag. Russian merchants were to be given the same privileges as "the most favored nations" England and France.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardjii ended the exclusive Turkish control of the Straits and the Black Sea and thereby inaugurated the modern phase of the Eastern question. Moreover, it occupies a unique position in Russo-Turkish relations, for all previous treaties between Russia and Turkey were expressly cancelled by it and all subsequent ones down to the Crimean War were based upon it.

However, Russia soon decided that the advantages derived from the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardjii were inadequate since her freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and the Straits depended on the Sublime Porte which could not be trusted because of the pressure brought to bear on it by the representatives of the Powers at Constantinople. Moreover, the same commercial privileges that had been wrung from

(1) Article XI





Turkey by means of costly wars were being conferred on other countries. Catherine, therefore, felt that a more definite arrangement was indispensable for the natural expansion of Russian commerce and dominion. Not long after the treaty of 1774 was concluded, Russia began to intervene in Turkish affairs. The Porte offered resistance and prepared for a resumption of hostilities. Eventually a convention was signed in 1779<sup>(1)</sup> whereby the provisions of the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardjii were confirmed and made more explicit and the privileges of navigation in the Black Sea were amplified. Turkish authority in the Danubian provinces was restricted, and Potemkin's nominee was recognized as Khan of the Crimea. In 1783 a sweeping commercial treaty elaborated the conditions under which the Russian commercial flag was to be permitted, like the flag of England and France, entry into Turkish ports. Russian commercial ships were to be permitted to pass the Straits without payment of any customs dues.

In 1782 Russian troops invaded and occupied the Crimea. In 1784 - England acquiescing and France being occupied in the west - the Treaty of Constantinople<sup>(2)</sup> was signed by which Turkey recognized the annexation of the Crimea and the Kuban. One month later Austria obtained from the Porte the right of free passage for her commercial flag.<sup>(3)</sup>

Catherine's ambition was great. It aimed at nothing less than the conquest of Constantinople itself. Having

- (1) Noradounghian Vol. I, p. 338
- (2) Ibid Vol. I, pp. 377-378
- (3) Ibid Vol. I, pp. 379-382



secured Austria as an ally she allowed, in 1789, the intrigues of her agents in the Ottoman dominions to be resumed. In the following year with the view of reestablishing a Greek Empire at Constantinople <sup>(1)</sup> the Empress undertook her famous journey to the Crimea, met the Polish king on her way, and was joined by Joseph II at Kherson. At Sebastopol she reviewed a powerful navy that had been created by herself. The Russian ambassador submitted fresh demands to the Porte officials which replied with a counter-proposal involving the restoration of the Crimea. When the ambassador declared that he had no power to sign such a document, he was thrown into prison, and the Turks, relying on the support of England and Prussia declared war. France remained neutral, but Austria joined Russia in 1788. In 1789 Turkey suffered a series of defeats and was saved only by the confusion in the Austrian dominions and by the intervention of the Triple Alliance - England, Holland, and Prussia. Austria withdrew from the war by the Peace of Sistova <sup>(2)</sup> in August 1791, but Russia continued single-handed on her road of success. Plans for the partition of Turkey were elaborated, but Catherine's desire to carry out her Polish policy while Austria and Prussia were occupied with France made Poland the victim instead. At Jassy in 1792 <sup>(3)</sup> a peace was concluded confirming the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardjii,

(1) She probably conceived this idea when "the Voltaireans and the encyclopaedists, several of whom were on terms of friendship with the Russian Empress, acclaimed the treaty (Kutchuk-Kainardjii) as a prelude to the reestablishment of the Greek Empire". Although "some time before", -- "Potemkin presented a project to Catherine for expelling the Turks from Europe and establishing a Greek Empire under a Russian grand-duke". Phillipson and Buxton pp. 27-28

(2) Noradounghian Vol. II, p. 13

(3) Ibid Vol. II, pp. 16-21



extending the western boundary of Russia to the Dniester, and giving to Russia all the coast of the Black Sea between the above mentioned river and the Bug, as well as the fortress of Ochakoff. The Russians surrendered all their conquests west of the Dniester, and the commercial treaty of 1783 was confirmed "since commerce is the truest and most constant bond of reciprocal harmony". Catherine's plans were thus progressing when in 1796 her death put an end to them.





### CHAPTER III

#### The Napoleonic Era

The reorganization of Russia as a great European power made the question of the Straits one of general European concern, not only as a commercial question but as a strategic problem. The Turkish commercial monopoly had been broken but the Sultan's right to control and to prohibit the passage of foreign warships through his territorial waters remained unimpaired. The problem of naval strategy was still to be settled.

Catherine's successor, Paul I, desiring to give Russia a respite from war, favored advancing the Turkish policy by means of diplomacy. The encouragement given by France to Poland, the Treaty of Campo-Formio (1797), and Napoleon's expedition into Egypt made the French a menace to Russia who reserved to herself alone the right to interfere in the East.

Napoleon's Egyptian expedition drew a third contestant, England, into the field. She noted the strategic importance of the Near Eastern route to India and began to play in earnest that role in the Levant which she has since followed - that of the supporter of the Ottoman Empire. Since the routes to India and Odessa crossed at Constantinople, Russia became the main competitor of England for the control of that people which controlled the Straits.

The first effect of Napoleon's activities in the East



was to throw Turkey into the hands of Russia. When the Sultan appealed to Paul for assistance, it was readily given. A fleet set sail for Constantinople, and, with the permission of the Porte, entered the Bosphorus in September, 1798. A Russo-Turkish convention quickly drawn up in October was converted into the Treaty of Constantinople in December. The following January England became a party to this alliance. This agreement between Russia and Turkey remained in force for eight years. Each undertook to protect the possessions of the other; Russia was to furnish the Porte with twelve vessels, and, if necessary with an army of seventy-five to eighty thousand men, and Turkey was to provide for the maintenance of all the ships and men. Turkey agreed also to the free passage of Russian warships through the Straits. By the combined action of the Russo-Turkish fleets, the French were forced to withdraw from the Ionian Islands, which they obtained by the Treaty of Campo-Formio. The barriers once down, the Russian fleet passed and repassed the Straits, regardless of treaty restrictions and Russia began definitely to formulate plans for the partition of Turkey.

In 1800 Count Rostopchin proclaimed that the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was the only solution of the Eastern question and the only national policy of Russia. His plan of partition gave Russia the largest share and England no share at all. Austria, Prussia, and France were to be the other

(1) Noradounghian Vol. II, pp. 24-31

(2) Dascovici, Nicolas "La question du Bosphore et des Dardanelles" pp. 147-148



three nations taking part in the division. Paul was in favor of the scheme and at the beginning of 1801 he allied himself with France, against England, in order to invade India across Asia and overthrow English power in the East. The murder of the Tsar in March and the accession of Alexander I, who was in favor of friendly relations with England, prevented the accomplishment of the plan.

The new Emperor's Turkish policy was to preserve, rather than destroy, a weak Ottoman power at the Straits, and to turn its weakness to Russia's advantage. The following year the minister Count Victor Kotchoubey presented a report to the Tsar which laid down as a fundamental principle of imperial politics that it was an advantage for Russia to have weak neighbors. He showed that only two courses were open: either to accelerate the dissolution of Turkey and share her dominions with Austria and France, or to preserve her existence by warding off every menace conducive to dismemberment; and that of these alternatives the latter was preferable. This view advocated by Kotchoubey was accepted. In March of 1802 the Peace of Amiens was concluded by England and France, and in June of the same year Turkey made a separate commercial treaty with France<sup>(1)</sup> whereby the Porte's possession of Egypt and all its territories was recognized, and the French capitulation of 1740 was renewed with additional provisions giving the French commercial flag the right to traverse the Straits and the freedom of the Black Sea.

(1) Noradounghian Vol. II, pp. 51-53





Before the expiration of the Russo-Turkish alliance of 1798, the Porte proposed negotiations for its renewal. Whereupon the Russian minister, Italinsky, at Constantinople, was charged to establish a close union with Turkey, with a view to her participating in a possible coalition against France, and to secure for Russia the right of intervention in Turkey in order to protect the Christian subjects of the Sultan and ameliorate their position. <sup>(1)</sup> In the course of his negotiations Italinsky urged the maintenance of Article X of the Treaty of Constantinople, which closed the Straits to the warships of other countries. He observed in his report to the Russian Government that if he did not insist on an express renewal of this provision, the English would obtain a passage for their warships to the Black Sea, and the French would follow suit. Accordingly, he secured the insertion in the projected secret convention of a clause which closed the Straits to the military flag of every nation, opened them to the Russian, and provided for their defense by the contracting parties in case any armed ship attempted to enter. This same clause was inserted in the treaty concluded with the Porte in September 1805. <sup>(2)</sup> Though the Black Sea was now possessed in common by the two signatories, the region of vital importance, namely the Straits, remained under the exclusive sovereignty of the Sultan. But Russian warships

(1) Gorîainow pp. 4 and 5

(2) Noradounghian Vol. II, pp. 70-77



acquired the liberty to proceed to the Ionian Islands during the stay of the Russian troops there for the purpose of protecting the new republic.

The treaty of 1805 was entered into for a period of nine years. Hardly was it concluded when Napoleon, flush with new victories over the Russians and Austrians, sent the adroit diplomatist, General Sebastiani, on a special embassy to Turkey. He soon induced the Ottoman Government to recognize the imperial title of Napoleon and urged a repudiation of the alliance with Russia and the firm retention of the Danubian provinces, Wallachia and Moldavia. Moreover, Sebastiani drew the attention of the Porte to the passage of the Russian warships through the Straits, and insisted on a renewal of the old restrictions, despite the authorization granted by the treaty of 1798 and renewal by that of 1805.

Italinsky was asked, in a friendly manner, to stop the passage of the Russian warships. The Turkish minister pointed out that Article IV of the recent treaty did not apply to the then existing circumstances, because the agreement was made in contemplation of a common and defensive war. Therefore, to permit Russian naval forces to pass for the purpose of adopting offensive measures against the French possession of the Adriatic would not be in keeping with it. Russia replied that Article IV was clear and precise; that the word 'war' was not mentioned in it; that the question



of distinguishing between an offensive and defensive war did not arise; that the ultimate destination of the Russian forces passing through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles was no concern of the Porte, which was entitled to ascertain only that the forces needed to pass for the purpose of proceeding to Corfu. However, in April 1806 Russia received a note asking her to discontinue the passage of warships.

Sebastiani stirred up Turkish feelings with regard to the Danubian provinces, and as a result, the Sultan deposed the hospodars in August - an act which to the Tsar constituted a legitimate cause for war. Furthermore, the Porte refused to abide by the treaty of 1805, and reiterated its intention to prevent the passage of Russian warships. Italinsky was ordered to demand the observance of the treaty, and in case of refusal, to ask for his passports. In October the Russian forces on the Dniester were ordered to invade Moldavia, and Italinsky was instructed to obtain a declaration from the Porte that it would adhere to its former undertaking and abstain from interfering with the passage of Russian warships. Before this order could reach Constantinople, the Russian ambassador was required by the Ottoman authorities to leave the capital, and upon his departure Turkey declared war.

England came to the support of her ally Russia and sent a fleet which forced the Dardanelles and actually reached





Constantinople. The energy of Sebastiani in hastily organizing the defence of the city caused its withdrawal without having achieved its purpose. In the meantime Russia had informed Turkey that her invasion of Moldavia was due to the Porte's violation of the treaty of 1805, and proposed that it should enter into an alliance with Russia and England, provided it would observe strictly the existing treaties, and maintain for Russian warships the right of passing the Straits. It was shown that the Russian army was sent to the Danube, not for conquest, but to protect Turkey from the designs of France, and that they would evacuate the principalities as soon as Sebastiani was dismissed and the required guarantees given.

Owing to the internal condition of Turkey, however, events took an unexpected turn. The Government was distracted by rebellions in the army and insurrections among the people. In May 1807 there took place a revolution which Napoleon made use of as a pretext for reconciling himself with Russia by the Peace of Tilsit, in July, whereby Alexander surrendered the Ionian Islands and Cataro.

At the end of this same year Napoleon and Alexander entered upon a long and tortuous scheme for the partition of Turkey. The plan never materialized in spite of a series of negotiations. Each emperor feared that the other cherished ideas of aggrandizement and they could not agree as to who should hold Constantinople and the Straits. Thus no agreement



was arrived at in regard to the partition. But in October of 1808 these same two entered the Treaty of Erfur against Great Britain.

More important than these arrangements as far as the Straits were concerned was the fact that England and Turkey were forced to become friendly again. The latter was alarmed at the Franco-Russian reconciliation and feared that the Tsar now would have a free hand in the East, and that the Porte could no longer count on French support to resist his designs. England was only too anxious to be on pacific terms with the Ottoman Empire. The result was the Treaty of Constantinople, commonly known as the Peace of the Dardanelles,<sup>(1)</sup> which contained the first formal assertion, in an international treaty, of the principle of the closing of the Straits to ships of war. The Porte, mindful of the recent appearance of the British fleet before Constantinople, definitely stipulated that since it had at all times been forbidden for vessels of war to enter into the canal of Constantinople, that is, into the Straits of the Dardanelles and into the waters of the Black Sea the court of Britain promised also to conform to this principle. It went further by stating that the 'ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire'<sup>(2)</sup> was to be observed henceforth in times of peace with reference to any Powers whatsoever. This was very cleverly done, because thus Turkey insisted on her sovereign

(1) Noradounghian Vol. II, p. 81

(2) This expression was "afterwards frequently repeated, and not only by Turkey, according to the exigencies of State interest arising in the remarkable vicissitudes of European political relationships".

Phillipson and Buxton "The Question of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles" p. 44



rights and won from Britain a formal recognition of them. In reality, Britain became the guardian of the Straits almost as much as Turkey. This provision constitutes the germ of the international convention laid down in the Straits Convention of 1841 when England again was to have its say as  
(1)  
to the settlement of the question.

Turkey, relying on British support, now renewed hostilities against Russia (1809). Due to Napoleon's preparations to invade Russia, the latter's plans for a march on Constantinople were cancelled and the Treaty of Bucharest  
(2)  
was signed in May 1812. Moldavia and Wallachia were restored to Turkey; Russia's frontier was advanced; and existing treaties between the two parties were confirmed. But no provision was made regarding the Straits, nor was there any mention of the right of passage that had been conferred on the Russian military flag by the Convention of 1805. So upon the whole, the Napoleonic period left the matter as Turkey and England wished.

- (1) Shotwell "A Short History of the Question of Constantinople and the Straits" p. 497  
(2) Noradounghian Vol. II, pp. 86-92





## CHAPTER IV

### Russian Supremacy

At the Congress of Vienna the question of the Straits was not considered. The British supported Metternich's plan to guarantee the existence of Turkey, but the Porte was suspicious of too much guardianship by the British, which suggested too nearly the idea of a protectorate. In a sense, therefore, Turkey played into the hands of the Tsar, who wished to avoid any guarantee of Ottoman integrity; and Turkey was still kept outside the European state-system.

In the meantime Russia was growing in population and in commerce, her military power was increasing considerably, and her navy was being enlarged; and her political position in Europe was becoming more important than ever. Hence the Ottoman Government always remained distrustful of the Russian policy. However, the Tsar, at the instance of some of the European powers, notably England and Austria, denounced the Greek War of Independence (1821-1829).

Russo-Turkish friction was soon renewed through the seizure in the Dardanelles of Greek vessels flying the Russian flag, the refusal of the Porte to withdraw its military forces from the Danubian provinces, and the execution of the Greek Patriarch and two of his bishops, in retaliation for massacres committed by the Greeks. The Russian people clamored for war but official England parleyed with its "ancient ally" the Turk,



and played with Metternich upon the pacific temper of Alexander I. But when Nicholas I took control of Russia in 1825, he quickly cowed the Porte into accepting the Treaty of Akkerman<sup>(1)</sup> which conceded to Russia her demands relative to the evacuation of the Principalities, the cession of certain Circassian fortresses, and the unrestricted enjoyment by the Russian commercial flag of liberty of navigation in all Ottoman waters.

(2)

Meanwhile, Britain, by the Treaty of London in July 1827, brought about an accord with France and Russia for joint intervention in the Eastern conflict to secure the autonomy of Greece under the suzerainty of the Sultan; but the British reluctance to weaken the Ottoman power, which muddled British policy with reference to Greece, finally left it to the Tsar to exert the coercion necessary for securing a settlement. The Russian armies marched across the Balkans for the first time and forced upon the Turk the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Adrianople<sup>(3)</sup> in September 1829.

This treaty is one of the most important in the history of the Eastern question. It not only recognized the independence of Greece, which marked a further step in the dissolution of the Turkish Empire, but it granted Anapi and Poti to Russia and confirmed the existing treaty rights of Russia in regard to her subjects' freedom of trade in Turkey, and freedom of navigation in the Straits and the Black Sea as seen in Article VII

(1) Martens "Nouveau Recueil" Vol. VI, p. 1053

(2) Ibid Vol. XII, p. 465

(3) Noradounghian Vol. II, pp. 166-173



which ran as follows (the first paragraph deals with freedom of trade in Turkey):-

'Russian subjects shall enjoy, throughout the whole extent of the Ottoman Empire, as well by land as by sea, the full and entire freedom of trade secured to them by the treaties concluded heretofore between the two high contracting Powers. This freedom of trade shall not be molested in any way, nor shall it be fettered in any case, or under any pretext, by any prohibition or restriction whatsoever, not in consequence of any regulation or measure, whether of public government or internal legislation, Russian subjects, ships, and merchandise, shall be protected from all violence and imposition. The first shall remain under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the Russian minister and consuls; Russian ships shall never be subjected to any search on the part of the Ottoman authorities, neither out at sea nor in any of the ports or roadsteads under the dominion of the Sublime Porte; and all merchandise or goods belonging to a Russian subject, may, after payment of the custom house dues imposed by the tariffs, be freely sold, deposited on land in the warehouses of the owner or consignee, or transhipped on board another vessel of any nation whatsoever, without the Russian subject being required, in this case, to give notice of the same to any of the local authorities, and much less to ask their permission so to do. It is expressly agreed that the different kinds of wheat coming from Russia shall partake of the same privileges,





and that their free transit shall never, under any pretext, suffer the least difficulty or hindrance.'

The second paragraph of the same article states free passage to Russian merchant vessels in the Straits. It reads:-

'The Sublime Porte engages, moreover, to take especial care that the trade and navigation of the Black Sea, particularly shall be impeded in no manner whatsoever. For this purpose it admits and declares the passage of the Strait of Constantinople and that of the Dardanelles to be entirely free and open to Russian vessels under the merchant flag, laden or in ballast, whether they come from the Black Sea for the purpose of entering the Mediterranean, or whether, coming from the Mediterranean, they wish to enter the Black Sea, such vessels, provided they be merchant ships, whatever their size and tonnage, shall be exposed to no hindrance or annoyance of any kind, as above provided. The two Courts shall agree upon the most fitting means for preventing all delay in issuing the necessary instructions. In virtue of the same principle the passage of the Strait of Constantinople and that of the Dardanelles is declared free and open to all the merchant ships of Powers who are at peace with the Sublime Porte, whether going into the Russian ports of the Black Sea or coming from them, laden or in ballast, upon the same conditions which are stipulated for vessels under the Russian flag.'



The last paragraph dealing with freedom of trade and navigation in the Black Sea:- 'Lastly, the Sublime Porte, recognizing in the Imperial Court of Russia the right of securing the necessary guarantees for this full freedom of trade and navigation in the Black Sea, declares solemnly that on its part not the least obstacle shall ever, under any pretext whatsoever, be opposed to it. Above all it promises never to allow itself henceforth to stop or detain vessels laden or in ballast, whether Russian or belonging to nations with whom the Ottoman Porte shall not be in a state of declared war, which vessels shall be passing through the Strait of Constantinople and the of the Dardanelles, on their way from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, or from the Mediterranean into the Russian ports of the Black Sea. And if, which God forbid, any one of the stipulations contained in the present article should be infringed, and the remonstrances of the Russian minister thereupon should fail in obtaining a full and prompt redress, the Sublime Porte recognizes beforehand in the Imperial Court of Russia the right of considering such an infraction as an act of hostility, and of immediately having recourse to reprisals, against the Ottoman Empire.'

So we see that the Treaty of Adrianople conferred great advantages on Russia with regard to Turkey. The privileges of her subjects in the Ottoman dominions were extended, and surpassed even those acquired by French subjects in the great capitulation of 1740. Some years before the conclusion of



the treaty Russia had tried to secure the right of passage for her warships, but this determination was not realized, as she had to reckon throughout, not only with opposition from the Sultan, but with firm resistance from the leading maritime powers of Europe. However, the Tsar now secured entirely undisturbed navigation for his commercial flag; no hindrance whatever was to be imposed on his merchantmen passing the Straits, and it was actually stipulated - a provision of this kind being of rare occurrence in international documents - that any act of interference should be considered a violation justifying recourse to reprisals.

In May of 1830 a treaty was concluded between the United States and Turkey which accorded to merchantmen of the United States, in the same way as to those of the most favored nation, the liberty to pass the 'canal of the imperial residence', and to enter and leave the Black Sea either laden or in ballast.  
(1)  
No mention was made of warships.

In 1832, the existence of the Ottoman Empire was threatened by the great revolt of Mehemet Ali, whose troops, overrunning most of Asiatic Turkey, were threatening the Straits. Again, as in the Napoleonic crisis, Russia profited. France sided with the cunning Albanian adventurer; England declined to act; and the hard pressed Sultan was forced to invite Russia to come in, with fleet and army, and save him from the rebels. The results were a Russian fleet and troops for the defense of

(1) Phillipson and Buxton p. 54





Constantinople itself, the passage of the Dardanelles by Russian warships, and the establishment of what amounted to a Russian protectorate over Turkey.

The treaty which embodied these conditions was signed at Unkiar-Skelessi in 1833.<sup>(1)</sup> By it Russia guaranteed the existence of an independent Turkey; both signatories agreed to peace, amity and alliance, a confirmation of all existing treaties, and a duration of this treaty for eight years.

A separate and secret article was added to the main text. It ran:-

'In virtue of one of the clauses of Article I of the patent treaty of defensive alliance concluded between the Imperial Court of Russia and the Sublime Porte, the two high contracting parties are bound to afford to each other mutually substantial aid, and the most efficacious assistance for the safety of their respective dominions. Nevertheless, His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, wishing to spare the Sublime Ottoman Porte the expense and inconvenience which might be occasioned to it by affording substantial aid, will not ask for that aid if circumstances should place the Sublime Porte under the obligation of furnishing it, the Sublime Ottoman Porte, in place of the aid which it is bound to furnish in case of need, according to the principle of reciprocity of the patent treaty, shall confine its action in favor of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the Straits of the Dardanelles, that is to say, to not allowing any foreign vessels of war to enter

(1) Noradounghian Vol. II, pp. 229-231



therein under any pretext whatsoever.'

The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi marks the zenith of Russian influence at Constantinople, and the secret clause is the expression of it. While its ambiguity has been the subject of much discussion, it was taken by Russia, at least, to mean that it guaranteed a free passage for Russian warships through the Straits "in case of need" - which covers a multitude of sins - and closed the entrance to the Black Sea to every other power.

The conclusion of this treaty aroused the fears of the western Powers. England and France made formal protests in notes of similar type. When the Russian Baltic fleet was permitted to pass the Straits after an Anglo-French squadron had made a demonstration at Tenedos without being allowed to enter them, Lord Palmerston objected that since Russian warships had been granted access to the Dardanelles, those of Great Britain claimed the same right in virtue of the Anglo-Turkish treaty of 1809.

In spite of all protests, Russia applied herself to guard with jealous vigilance the privileges she acquired by the treaty. Thus in 1835 an American frigate reached Constantinople and asked permission to enter the Black Sea. The Porte having submitted the request to Boutenieff, the Russian ambassador, the latter advised a refusal, for fear that the European Powers use the incident as a pretext for demanding authorization for their own ships to pass the Straits.



## CHAPTER V

### Russia Against Western Europe

The secret clause of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was soon whispered abroad, and the disturbance it caused was reflected in European diplomacy. While England and France protested, Nesselrode and Metternich signed the secret Convention of Munchengratz in 1833 whereby both parties agreed to combine their efforts for the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in case it was threatened with dissolution through the designs of any political combination; and should their efforts to prevent dissolution fail, they bound themselves to act in accord in every thing concerning the establishment of the new order of things. This was a clever means on the part of Metternich to draw from Russia an avowal of innocent purposes, which tided Europe through the crises by paving the way to an Anglo-Russian understanding. The insincerity of Turkey toward Russia, which had imposed such humiliating terms upon it, also made Russia's triumph less secure and therefore less menacing to the interests of the rest of Europe.

In 1839 war broke out again between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, resulting in the complete defeat of the Turk. The Ottoman Empire again seemed about to dissolve, with Russia waiting to share the spoils on the north and France about to profit in Egypt by its friendship for Mehemet Ali. Metternich had, at the outbreak of the war, proposed action by the

(1) Martens-Recueil Vol. IV, pp. 445 seq.





European Concert, and France and England quickly took up the idea of common action, but French public opinion objected to too close association with English aims. Russia, taking advantage of this divergence of opinion, refused to join and advised the Sultan to make peace with Mehemet directly, without reference to Europe. The Tsar felt that any action of the Powers, if they came together, would undo the advantages he had held since Unkiar-Skelessi. However, Metternich anticipating objections, had the Austrian ambassador at Constantinople present the Sultan a collective note from the Five Powers, stating that they had reached an agreement on the Eastern question, and warning the Porte to refrain from any final decision without their concurrence and to await the results of their interest in its welfare.

Baron Brunnow was sent to London to sow dissension between France and England. The Tsar's strong personal dislike of France was an element in the situation playing into the plans of Palmerston whose objections to the French plan of favoring Mehemet Ali's ambitions upon Syria were soon shared by Berlin and Vienna as well as St. Petersburg. Palmerston was astounded when the Russian ambassador went so far as to intimate a willingness to reconsider the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, stating that the Tsar had regarded that treaty not as a means for establishing an absolute protectorate over Turkey but as a measure of security for the Porte. The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi might be revised by proclaiming the



closing of the Straits at all times a universally recognized public law of Europe. Upon the basis of such plans Russia then suggested that England's fleet attack Mehemet's port of Alexandria while the Russian army went to Constantinople to safeguard the capital from the rebels. Palmerston naturally refused to enter upon a plan which brought the Russians to Constantinople alone, and it was only after long drawn-out negotiations, to which France was not a party that an agreement was reached by the four Powers of Russia, Britain, Prussia, and Austria.

(2)

The Treaty of London concluded in July 1840 embodied this agreement. Article I stated that the contracting Powers had come to an agreement with Turkey as to what terms Mehemet Ali should receive; and Article II declared that in case Mehemet refused to accept them, they, the Powers, would undertake to force him to do so.

Articles III and IV were fundamental in the history of the Straits and ran:-

'Article III. If Mehemet Ali, after having refused to submit to the conditions of the arrangement above mentioned, should direct his land or sea forces against Constantinople, the high contracting Powers, upon the express demand of the Sultan, addressed to their representatives at Constantinople, agree, in such case, to comply with the request of that Sovereign, and to provide for the defence of his throne by

(1) France due to her interest in Egypt was carrying on secret negotiations with the Sublime Porte.

(2) Noradounghian Vol. II, pp. 303 seq.



means of coöperation agreed upon by mutual consent, for the purpose of placing the two Straits of the Bosphor~~us~~ and Dardanelles, as well as the capital of the Ottoman Empire, in security against all aggression.

'It is further agreed that the forces which, in virtue of such concert, may be sent as aforesaid, shall there remain so employed as long as their presence shall be required by the Sultan; and when His Highness shall deem their presence no longer necessary, the said forces shall simultaneously withdraw, and shall return to the Black Sea and to the Mediter-  
ranean respectively.

'Article IV. It is, however, expressly understood, that the coöperation mentioned in the preceding Article, and destined to place the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphor~~us~~, and the Ottoman capital, under the temporary safeguard of the high contracting parties against all aggression of Mehemet Ali, shall be considered only as a measure of exception adopted at the express demand of the Sultan, and solely for his defence in the single case above mentioned; but it is agreed that such measure shall not derogate in any degree from the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has in all times been prohibited for ships of war of foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphor~~us~~. And the Sultan, on the one hand, hereby declares that, excepting the contingency above mentioned, it is his firm resolution to maintain in future this principle





invariably established as the ancient rule of his Empire; and as long as the Porte is at peace, to admit no foreign ship of war into the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles; on the other hand, their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform to the above mentioned principle.'

By a protocol which was afterwards incorporated in the Convention of 1841, the Ottoman plenipotentiary reserved to the Porte the right to deliver passes to light vessels under a flag of war which could be employed according to custom for the service of the correspondence of the legations of friendly Powers.

By this treaty the considerable advantages which Russia had derived from the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi were cancelled. The Tsar would undoubtedly have hesitated to enter into such a transaction had he not been at the time animated with hatred for the July monarchy. However, the real significance of the Treaty of London is that it translates into European public law a principle which had previously been recognized only in the dealings of individual Powers with Turkey. The "ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire" was formulated by the Sultan towards the end of the eighteenth century as principle of Turkish public administration, but now "four of the leading Powers of Europe



jointly recognize in a formal international instrument the applicability of the rule of closing the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to warships of all States, while the Sultan, engaging to observe this rule in general, formally surrenders<sup>(1)</sup> his former right of opening the Straits at discretion."

The next year a still further step was taken by extending the recognition of the rule and at the same time widening and so reinforcing the obligation of the Porte. France signed a general treaty recognizing the obligation of the Sultan to close the Straits to foreign warships in time of peace. This Convention of the Straits was accepted by other Powers later, and became a general rule of European international law. Its provisions are very brief and clear, consisting of the following three articles and an additional one dealing with ratifications:

'Article I. His Highness the Sultan, on the one part, declares that he is firmly resolved to maintain for the future the principle invariably established as the ancient rule of the Empire, and in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for the ships of war of foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus; and that so long as the Porte is at peace, His Highness will admit no Foreign Ship of War into the said Straits.

'And their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King

(1) Phillipson and Buxton p. 77



of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of the French, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, on the other part, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan and to conform themselves to the principle above declared.

'Article II. It is understood that in recording the inviolability of the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire mentioned in the preceding Article, the Sultan reserves to himself, as in past times, to deliver firmans of passage to light vessels under flag of war, which shall be employed as is usual in the service of the missions of foreign Powers.

'Article III. His Highness the Sultan reserves to himself to communicate the present Convention to all the Powers with whom the Sublime Porte is in relations of friendship, inviting them to accede thereto.<sup>(1)</sup>'

This Convention, reaffirmed in its essentials in the Treaty of Paris in 1856, and again in the Treaty of London in 1871, was the fundamental document in the international law of the Straits down to the World War. It robbed Russia of its predominance in Turkish affairs and hence led the Tsar Nicholas to make use of the theory of the "sick man of Europe" whose inheritance should be divided among the Powers. The first step toward this end showed that the heirs could not agree, and the quarrel over the spoils began. It was not for the control of the Straits that they now fought, but for the rights of Russia as the protector of the Orthodox clergy and

(1) Shotwell pp. 510-511





of France as the ancient champion of Catholicism in the East at the holy places in the Sultan's realm. Russia finally, unable to secure full privileges from the Porte, took matters into her own hands and invaded Turkey in 1853. She claimed that she was not at war for material gain but that she had been forced to take the defensive side against Turkey who was trying to drive the Russians from Ottoman soil.

The action of Russia at once involved France, since Napoleon III was strongly committed to a clerical policy, and England, as the traditional protector of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, was drawn into common action with France. The British and French fleets entered the Sea of Marmora justifying this act by the Straits Convention. Russia claimed that, under pretext of saving Turkey, they had openly violated the Convention. After concluding a treaty of alliance with Turkey, France and England declared war on Russia. This was known as the Crimean War since it was fought out on the Crimea, by the aid of the allied fleets which struck at the great Russian fortress on the Black Sea, Sebastopol.

The peace negotiations were begun before the Crimean War was finished. The allied Powers laid down the fundamental conditions demanded by them in the form of 'four points'. These were: 1. the abolition of the Russian protectorate over the Danubian principalities; 2. the free navigation of the Danube; 3. the neutralization of the Black Sea; and 4. the position of the Christians of Turkey. The third, involving a



revision of the treaty of 1841, was the most difficult question to settle. It was to be expected that after a disastrous war, Russia would surrender the position it had held, with reference to Turkey, but to accept the full humiliation of a neutralized sea on its southern frontier was to accept the terms of the vanquished. This it was forced to do after the fall of Sebastopol.

The Conference at Paris of the Powers of Europe (including Sardinia) drew up the Treaty of Paris in 1856 which for the next fourteen years determined the status of the Straits. A separate Convention between the six Powers and the Sultan, signed at the same time as the Treaty and attached to it by Article X reaffirmed textually the clauses of the proposals in the Treaty concerning the control of the navigation of the Danube, by which each of the Powers was permitted to send through the Straits two light vessels of war for service off the mouth of the Danube. Otherwise the Convention which regulated the régime of the Straits in 1856 merely reenacted the Convention of 1841.

The most significant work of the Conference at Paris was the neutralization of the Black Sea, an attempt to forestall future complications in the Near East by imposing a sweeping prohibition on Russian preparedness. Russia was to be denied not only a fleet on its southern coastal waters but even arsenals along its shores. The clauses dealing with this matter ran:-

(1) Hertslet - Map of Europe - Vol. II, p. 1250



'Article XI. The Black Sea is neutralized, its waters and its ports thrown open to the mercantile marine of every nation, are formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war, either of the Powers possessing its coasts, or of any other Power, with the exceptions mentioned in Articles XIV and XIX of the present treaty.

'Article XII. Free from any impediment, the commerce in the ports and waters of the Black Sea shall be subject only to regulations of health, customs and police, framed in a spirit favorable to the development of commercial transactions.

'In order to afford to the commercial and maritime interests of every nation the security which is desired, Russia and the Sublime Porte will admit consuls into their ports situated upon the coast of the Black Sea, in conformity with the principles of international law.

'Article XIII. The Black Sea being neutralized according to the terms of Article XI, the maintenance or establishment upon its coast of military-maritime arsenals becomes alike unnecessary and purposeless; in consequence, His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, engage not to establish or to maintain upon that coast any military-maritime arsenal.

'Article XIV. Their Majesties the Emperor of All the Russias and the Sultan having concluded a Convention for the purpose of settling the force and the number of light vessels,





necessary for the service of their coasts, which they reserve to themselves to maintain in the Black Sea, that Convention is annexed to the present treaty, and shall have the same force and validity as if it formed an integral part thereof. It cannot be either annulled or modified without the assent of the Powers signing the present treaty.'

On the proposal of Austria a convention was signed at Paris, in April, between Great Britain, France, and Austria, for the purpose of insuring the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire by means of their joint and several guarantee. It was agreed that any infraction of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris would be considered by the signatories as a cause for war. Russia is not mentioned, but it is obvious that it was directed against her; for it was Great Britain's policy to prevent the Tsar from becoming master of the Straits and so endangering British interests in the East; and it was the object of Austria to prevent the Tsar from occupying the Danubian Principalities. Russia's position after the settlement, therefore, was a most disadvantageous one. Before the Russian expansion under Peter the Great and Catherine II the Black Sea was a Turkish lake. After the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi it became virtually a Russian lake. Now, the Treaty of Paris made it a European Sea, and placed it under the express sanction of the Powers. To the existing notions of free sea and territorial sea - "mare liberum" or "apertum", and "mare clausum" - a new conception



was added, viz. that of a neutralized sea, thus the principle of continental neutralization, adopted in the interests of political equilibrium, was applied to a maritime sphere with the same object.<sup>(1)</sup>

During this era there was evident in Europe a pronounced nationalistic spirit. The age of Italy's and Germany's unification, and of England's world wide development, could not well leave Russia suffering the constant sense of humiliation in the limitation upon her power of defense along the whole southern frontier. Alexander II, although chagrined by this constant reminder of defeat, steadily refused to bring up the question of the revision of the Treaty of Paris so long as the proposition was likely to bring another war. France approached Russia with the idea in 1858 before the war with Austria, who did likewise after the war in 1859, and again in 1867. William I of Prussia approached her also in 1866 after the Seven Weeks War. Always Alexander refused to act. His patience was rewarded by 1870 when the Franco-Prussian war offered a chance for Russia to recover what she had lost, since western Europe was too much preoccupied with its own affairs to interfere.

Bismarck's assent to Russia's denunciation of the objectionable terms of the Treaty of Paris was easily won, and the other signatories not being in a position to make war, Gortchakov issued his famous circular dispatch in October 1870.

(1) Phillipson and Buxton p. 99



In it he protested that fifteen years' experience had proved false the assumptions in the Treaty of Paris that neutralization of the Black Sea would safeguard the peace of all interested. In truth, while Russia disarmed in the Black Sea, Turkey maintained unlimited naval forces in the Aegean and Straits, and France and England could mobilize their fleets in the Mediterranean. There was, so he claimed, a contradiction between the treaty itself and the Convention of the Straits attached to it; since the former forbade warships to sail the Black Sea at any time, while the latter prohibited them from passing the Straits into the Black Sea only in time of peace. This, he said, exposed Russia to coastal attacks from less powerful states, while she was unprepared. Moreover, he claimed that in the interim the treaty had been modified with reference to Moldavia and Wallachia; infractions had occurred in that "whole squadrons" of foreign warships had been admitted to the Black Sea.<sup>(1)</sup> The danger for Russia thus increased. Therefore, a treaty thus violated had no longer binding force, and Russian security could no longer be allowed to depend on a fiction that failed to stand the test of time. Accordingly, Russia, considering her safety and dignity, was forced to withdraw from the treaty in question, and, "in the interests of peace, was prepared to come to an understanding

(1) "In 1871 a return laid before Parliament showed that the number of foreign ships of War which had passed the Straits were: In 1862, 1 British; in 1866, 1 American; in 1868, 1 American, 2 Austrian, 1 French, 1 Russian; in 1869, 1 Prussian. It also appeared that in seven other instances, questions had arisen with regard to the passage of Foreign Ships of War through the Straits, but that in no case had a violation of treaty been shown to have taken place." Footnote in Shotwell "A Short History of the Straits" Quoted by him from Hertslet III, p. 1895







with the Powers for the purpose of establishing a just and equitable arrangement on a more solid foundation.<sup>(1)</sup> The note concluded with the statement that the Tsar did not wish to revive the Eastern Question, and adhered to the general principles of 1856 which fixed the position of Turkey in the European system.

In addition to the circular, a special despatch, containing appropriate comments, was sent to each signatory Power.

England protested to Gortchakov's note at once through Lord Granville, Foreign Minister, who claimed that no one signatory could thus release itself from its obligations but that such a right belonged only to all the governments who had been party to the original instrument. The British Government was thus not objecting to a consideration of a revision of the Treaty of Paris. What it questioned was the right of one party to a treaty to declare it void when it no longer suited its convenience. The Russian claim, if admitted as a precedent, might undermine the whole structure of international law by reducing treaties to mere "scraps of paper".

France, Austria, and Turkey, also objected to a unilateral renunciation.

Italy did not oppose a revision of the treaty, provided that the Turkish Empire remained intact.

According to Gorïainow,<sup>(2)</sup> opinion in the United States was on the side of Russia. Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State,

(1) Phillipson and Buxton - p. 107

(2) This fact rests wholly on the despatches of Catacazy who was known as one whose word was not to be trusted.



informed Catacazy, the Russian minister at Washington, that the American government had never recognized the Treaty of Paris; and suggested the conclusion of an alliance between the two Powers, if Russia would support the United States in the Alabama affair.

Negotiations were, however, soon begun for arranging a Conference of the Powers concerned. London was agreed upon as the place of meeting.

Bismarck agreed to take part provided the Franco-Prussian question was not introduced. Turkey consented to participate on condition that the negotiations be confined to those provisions of the Treaty of Paris that Russia found objectionable. Russia was desirous that the Conference would concern itself only with her complaints in regard to the stipulations that affected her security, dignity, and honor.

After much negotiation relative to the order and form of proceedings to be observed at the Conference, the first meeting was held in January 1871. Lord Granville began business by securing a declaration on the inviolability of treaties.

After several failures to secure a statement that was acceptable to all, the Treaty of London was finally accepted <sup>(1)</sup> March 13, 1871. The articles relating to the Straits and the Black Sea were:-

'Article I. Articles XI, XIII, XIV of the Treaty of Paris of the 30th March, 1856, as well as the special convention concluded between Russia and the Sublime Porte, and

(1) Hertslet "Map of Europe" Vol. III, p. 1919



annexed to the said Article XIV, are abrogated, and replaced by the following article.

'Article II. The principle of the closing of Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, such as it has been established by the separate convention of the 30th March, 1856, is maintained, with power to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan to open the said Straits in time of peace to vessels of war of friendly and allied Powers, in case the Sublime Porte should judge it necessary in order to secure the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris of the 30th March, 1856.

'Article III. The Black Sea remains open, as heretofore, to the mercantile marine of all nations.

'Article VIII. The high contracting parties renew and confirm all stipulations of the Treaty of the 30th March, 1856, as well as of its annexes, which are not annulled or modified by the present treaty.'

(1)

A separate convention between Russia and Turkey stated:-

'Article I. The special convention concluded at Paris between His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan on the 18/30th March, 1856, relative to the number and force of the vessels of war of the two high contracting parties in the Black Sea, is and remains abrogated.'

The Treaty of London enabled Russia to build and maintain a fleet in the Black Sea, to restore the fortifications

(1) Hertslet "Map of Europe" Vol. III, p. 1924





of Sebastopol, and so to be in a position to become once again a menace to Constantinople. The rule as to closing the Straits was left as under the treaties of 1841 and 1856. The Sultan's power to open them was enlarged: before 1871 he was not allowed, as long as he was at peace, to admit foreign warships; by the Treaty of London he was permitted to open them to warships of friendly Governments if he thought it necessary in order to preserve the unrevoked articles of 1856. This treaty remained in force until the World War.

the first of these is the fact that the system is not in a steady state. The second is that the system is not in a steady state.

The third is that the system is not in a steady state. The fourth is that the system is not in a steady state.

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The ninth is that the system is not in a steady state. The tenth is that the system is not in a steady state.

CHAPTER VI  
From The Treaty of London  
To The Treaty of Berlin

We have just seen that by the Treaty of London the Russians were allowed to maintain warships in the Black Sea, while the Turks were allowed to open the Straits in peace as well as in war to allied and friendly Powers. This permission as well as Articles VII and IX of the Treaty of Paris were abused by the Turks.

The situation of the Christians and especially of the Slavs grew worse and worse until in 1875 it was evident that a crisis of some sort must be faced. In the summer of that year a revolt in an obscure village of Herzegovina (southern Bosnia) seemed at the outset to be merely an internal affair of Turkey but proved to be a movement that spread all over the Balkan peninsula, leading to a war involving Russia as well as the Balkans and ending in an important international congress. The corruption of the Turkish Government and the overweeningness of the landed class led to this and subsequent risings in Bosnia.

At approximately this same time the Porte was forced to anger the French, German, British, and Hebraic financial world by refusing to pay all the interest on its swollen public debt.

Germany, Russia, and Austria under Bismarck formed a loose alliance and in 1876 presented to the Porte a demand

- (1) By Article VII of the Treaty of Paris the territorial integrity of Turkey was guaranteed by all the other combatant Powers and also by Austria and Prussia.
- (2) Article IX stated the Sultan's good intentions toward his Christian subjects.

# THE HISTORY OF THE CITY OF BOSTON

FROM THE FIRST SETTLEMENT TO THE PRESENT TIME  
BY  
JOSEPH NEALE, ESQ.

(Author of the History of the City of New York, &c.)  
IN TWO VOLUMES.  
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(1)  
reform known as the "Andrassy Note", gaining its name from its reputed author, the Austrian Chancellor. The Porte accepted it, but in the usual manner of the Ottoman Government failed to act according to the agreement.

In the following year England's stand was the deciding factor in the diplomatic movements of the other Powers. France could not adventure in this direction since she had not recovered from her troubles of 1870. Germany was attempting the impossible in trying to keep general peace and at the same time hold the friendship of both Russia and Austria. Tsar Alexander II of Russia unquestionably wanted to avoid war although he had to deal with the Pan-Slavist movement, the religious tie, and the officials who felt that this was an opportunity to redeem the humiliation of the Crimean War. His ministers presently thought that they could reach an understanding with Austria which would save them from a repetition of the disasters of the 1850's.

England remained. She was now under the premiership of Disraeli whose sympathies very evidently lay with Turkey. In his speeches he tended to ignore or apologize for the shortcomings of the Porte. Consequently the Turks counting on British support continued along the same line of action.

Since the "Andrassy Note" had no definite results and the insurrection in Bosnia threatened to spread, the same three nations, Germany, Austria, and Russia, presented the

(1) Great Britain gave the note its general adhesion.





Porte with the Berlin memorandum, which proposed an armistice and a mixed commission, adding that the Christians should be allowed to retain their arms, and that the Turkish troops should be concentrated. In other words they specifically stated their demands. France and Italy gave their adhesion to the document, but the government of Great Britain ostentatiously declined. "A British fleet even rode off the Dardanelles as if to give support to the Porte against Russia."<sup>(1)</sup>

The result of these diplomatic maneuvers was inevitable. The situation became increasingly unbearable, and war was declared at first by Serbia and then by Montenegro.

Bulgaria was the next in line to be aroused by Ottoman misrule. She had already shown since 1856 a decided tendency towards the development of a sense of nationality, and now when Serbia and Montenegro took up arms to assist their oppressed brothers in Bosnia, there was a stir in many of the Bulgarian villages leading to a series of revolts that were answered by savage reprisals known as the "Bulgarian atrocities". Wholesale massacres, and acts of lust and perfidy drew Russian indignation to a high peak, since she always considered herself the protector of Orthodox Christians and the smaller Slavic states.

The defeat of the Serbian forces and the Turkish reaction to the Bulgarian insurrections brought matters to the point of eruption which stayed the Turkish advance in the

(1) Davis, William Stearns "A Short History of the Near East" p. 332. Davis is the only one to mention this fact. If true, it is important since it shows the extent to which the British government was opposed to Russia.



Balkans. Russia, in November 1876, issued an ultimatum to Turkey demanding an armistice within forty-eight hours or war with the Tsar. The Porte accepted the proposed armistice.

In the meantime the horrible acts of the Turks were forcing from them their lone friend, England. (1) Although Disraeli and the Tories tried to minimize the reports of these barbaric deeds, the country was aroused by newspaper accounts and in the main by Gladstone's appearance in public life once more. This opponent of Disraeli left his theological studies to write his famous pamphlet on the "Bulgarian Horrors" which stirred the English temper to the point of anger so that the Foreign Secretary was forced to telegraph to Constantinople that "'any renewal of such outrages would prove more disastrous to the Porte than the loss of a battle'" (2) and that "'any sympathy previously felt -- had been completely destroyed by the lamentable occurrences in Bulgaria'" (3). Thus the English policy turned from one of extreme favoritism of Turkey to one of confusion. Lord Beaconsfield, as Prime Minister, and the Queen, felt that the Eastern Question was a duel between Russia and England. It was impossible for Great Britain as a European nation to oppose Russia's desire to improve the condition of Turkey's Christian subjects, but Beaconsfield and the Queen were one in the opinion that Russia's real aim was the destruction of the Turkish Empire and her own

- (1) Disraeli - Letter to Lady Bradford - "Everything has gone against us - but nothing so much as the "Bulgarian Atrocities" which changed the bent of opinion in England as regards Turkey --- ". Letters of Disraeli to Lady Chesterfield and Lady Bradford. p. 84
- (2) Miller, William "The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors" p. 365
- (3) Davis, William Stearns "A Short History of the Near East 330 - 1922 A. D." p. 334





aggrandizement through the acquisition of Constantinople and the Straits which meant to them the "key to India". It was this policy that they felt duty bound to oppose. Alexander assured the British Ambassador that he had no such intentions.

Derby, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs adopted the lazy man's policy of peace and laissez-faire; while Salisbury felt that a new and permanent solution could be found in a partition of Turkey.<sup>(1)</sup>

As a last resort in the latter part of 1876 a conference of the Powers was called at Constantinople to find a way in which the Balkan troubles might be ended and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire be kept intact but this attempt failed because of Turkey's attitude. First of all the new Padishah bestowed upon his people a liberal constitution and informed the Powers that they must refrain from action until his Parliament could meet and enact specific laws correcting the objectionable wrongs in the Balkans. The plenipotentiaries of Europe paid little attention to this act but went ahead and formulated their demands which were refused by the Porte. The conference broke up, but one last appeal was made by a fresh conference held in London. Here the Powers signed the "London Protocol" but this too was rejected and war was inevitable. It broke out in 1877.

(1) In a letter to Lord Lytton in 1877 he thus expressed this idea - "I feel convinced that the old policy - wise enough in its time - of defending English interests by sustaining the Ottoman dynasty has become impracticable, and I think the time has come for defending English interests in a more direct way by some territorial re-arrangement."  
Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury by Lady Cecil p. 130





Alexander II of Russia had begun his preparations since the serving of the ultimatum in the fall of 1876. His first moves had been to secure the neutrality of Austria and Germany. The former necessitated two secret conventions which assured her neutrality so long as Russia did not overstep certain restrictions laid down by Count Andrassy.<sup>(1)</sup>

Since the relations between the Emperor of Germany and his nephew the Tsar of Russia were friendly, and since Bismarck maintained a public policy of neutrality but privately encouraged Russia, it was with little difficulty that Russia gained a promise of neutrality from her.

As for the rest of Europe Gortchakov, the Russian Chancellor, had tried to make it evident in a circular of January that Russia would undertake a war only as the mandatory of Europe and to avenge the wrongs of the Christians. Since the Porte had failed to respond to the "London Protocol", Gortchakov published another circular in April explaining the necessity of war thus hoping to secure the neutrality and possibly to gain the approval of Europe in her humanitarian mission. Lord Beaconsfield proposed to declare to Russia what interests Great Britain would be ready to defend if she thought them menaced, and at the same time to seize some place in the East, the Dardanelles or some other point, and hold it as a guarantee of Russia's good behavior. To do this it was necessary to

(1) Lee, Dwight Erwin - British Policy in the Eastern Question 1878 - Dissertation - Harvard University - 1928 "He stipulated that Russia in her military operations should respect a neutral zone comprised of Serbia, Montenegro, and the lands between the two, and he further bound her regarding the territorial changes that might follow the war."



have Turkey's consent, which meant an alliance with her; or to have Russian agreement concerning opposition to Turkey; or to act independently in opposition to Turkey without the agreement of Russia. Few in the country would agree to an alliance with Turkey; Beaconsfield and the Queen would not give ear to the second alternative, and the third was considered too dangerous since it appeared too much like a grab of territory. The occupation of the Straits by Great Britain would most probably lead to riots in Constantinople and necessitate interference. If Russia reached Constantinople she would try to oust the British.

Furthermore, any move that Great Britain might safely take in the Straits required the neutrality of the other Mediterranean Powers. The Italian ministers implied that their country would offer no resistance to British action in the Straits but the attitude of France was quite different. Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador, at Paris, stated that France would be unwilling to offend Russia, and that in the question of the Straits she could not be counted upon to aid England in resisting Russian aims and desires.

The policy finally adopted by Great Britain was one of compromise. The Cabinet decided to declare their views of the Russian declaration of war and to define their interests. Two notes of May 1st and May 6th embodied the policy which England followed until the end of the war. The first of these despatches was addressed to Lord Loftus, British Ambassador to



Russia, in answer to Gortchakov's Circular of April 19, and showed plainly that Great Britain would not acquiesce in a Russian settlement of the Eastern Question.

The second note was addressed to Count Shuvalov, the Russian Ambassador to England. It made clear the danger points which Russia would be wise to avoid. The vital points of Constantinople and the Straits were treated with firmness. In regard to the former, the British Government was "not prepared to witness with indifference the passing into other hands than those of its present possessors, of a capital holding so peculiar and commanding a position"<sup>(1)</sup>. They regarded the existing laws regulating the navigation of the Straits as "wise and salutary"<sup>(2)</sup> and objected to their alteration "in any material particular"<sup>(3)</sup>.

Shuvalov made it his business to gain information regarding the secrets of the foreign office and as soon as he learned Beaconsfield's attitude toward the Russian war, he began to urge his government to come to an understanding with England regarding the points of interest which might cause British interference. He argued that unless an agreement was reached, Russian successes would excite England to the point of making decisions that might lead to a conflict. Shuvalov's plan, being the natural complement of the Russian policy toward Austria and Germany, was adopted. Gortchakov wished to extend it to include Austria and thus promote an agreement

(1) Lee, Dwight Erwin "British Policy in the Eastern Question 1878" p. 21

(2) Ibid

(3) Ibid







between the three Powers most directly concerned in the peace settlement.

In her formal acceptance of Britain's restrictions, Russia repeated her assurances concerning Constantinople, affirming that its acquisition was not a part of the Tsar's aims, that its fate was a common interest which could be regulated only by a general understanding and that if the possession of the city should be a matter of doubt it should go to none of the European Powers. The question of the Straits was to be likewise settled by a common accord on the basis of equitable and effective guarantees; but if victorious, Russia could not be expected not to wish to change the existing agreements. However, any modification of them would be settled by common agreement among the Powers. Concerning the final peace, the English insistence upon the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was not irreconcilable with the Russian demand for betterment of conditions for the Orthodox Christians. Russia did her part in stating the terms she would accept before crossing the Balkans, and if Turkey refused to accept these terms, Russia would be compelled to continue the war. The peace then concluded would depend upon events of the future but would be made with the assent of the Powers if they remained neutral; and neutrality in the opinion of the Russian Government would not permit Great Britain to occupy Constantinople or the Dardanelles.



Bismarck's ideas on the solution of the Eastern Question were important and came to light in May. In general, he felt that England's note of May 6th would furnish a basis upon which the war could be localized and a lasting peace made. There were only two points of interest, he said, over which Russia and England could conflict with each other and those were: Constantinople and the navigation of the Bosphorous and Dardanelles. However, Shuvalov had told Bismarck that if Russia were victorious on the North side of the Balkans after crossing the Danube, a first attempt would be made at an armistice and peace negotiations. To that Bismarck gladly gave his support, but in case the first attempts failed, Bismarck thought that a second attempt should be made before the Russians reached Constantinople. But, if this too failed, and they marched on Constantinople, further localization would become problematical and the peace of Europe doubtful. Therefore, Bismarck hoped that the warning of Great Britain to St. Petersburg would be followed by an English occupation of the Dardanelles, "the effect of which would be to arrest the advance of the Russians on Constantinople and to facilitate peace negotiations before further localization of the war became impossible".<sup>(1)</sup>

Bismarck<sup>1</sup> asserted that he was in favor of any settlement leading to a lasting peace and stated that neither Austria nor Germany could object to a modification of the Straits arrangement although other Powers might do so.

(1) Lee, Dwight Erwin "British Policy in the Eastern Question 1878" p. 26



Upon one point Bismarck's policy was not quite clear. He advised England to seize the Dardanelles, while a month later he believed that it was best for England not to attempt it for fear of encouraging the Turks. It is possible that he hoped that the immediate seizure of the Straits would commit England to the partition of Turkey which he had urged and still continued to urge. Or perhaps he had suggested to Shuvalov that, in view of the agitation in England for some material guarantee, he ought to persuade his government to acquiesce to an English occupation of the Straits as a concession to English sensitiveness. The refusal of Russia to permit such action by England may have caused the German premier to change his views. Although there is no evidence that such was the case, the effect of his hint to take the Dardanelles was disastrous. It appeared very much like intrigue, since at this time it was asserted from all sides that an intimate understanding existed between the Three Powers. Such an obvious effort to strengthen Shuvalov's hand miscarried, for only the Queen, under the influence of the British Ambassador at Germany, Lord Russell, favored the idea of trying to carry Bismarck with England in the negotiations with Russia. No action, therefore, was taken on the part of England in answer to Bismarck's suggestion except that Beaconsfield sent word to Bismarck by Russell early in July that England counted upon the support of Germany in maintaining the sovereignty of the Sultan and the principles which regulated the navigation of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.



The first part of the paper discusses the importance of the study of the history of the United States. It is argued that a knowledge of the past is essential for a full understanding of the present. The author then proceeds to a detailed examination of the various factors which have shaped the development of the United States, from the early years of settlement to the present day. He discusses the role of the different states, the influence of foreign powers, and the impact of internal conflicts. The paper concludes by emphasizing the need for a balanced and objective approach to the study of history, one which takes into account all the relevant facts and circumstances.



Meanwhile Russia was busy at Rome and Paris with a plan for securing an agreement in regard to the final settlement. There was no doubt but that the opening of the Dardanelles would be the only delicate and difficult question likely to be included in the Russian terms of peace. All were anxious to mediate before Russia crossed the Danube so that as much of Turkey as possible might be kept safe. But any terms suggested by Russia were considered far from moderate and England felt that their negotiations with Russia were part of a trap to keep the British quiet and to let Russia do as she wished. Consequently when it was reported from Layard at St. Petersburg that the Russian press was urging the free passage of the Straits and that the Russians were within two days' march from Adrianople, Lord Beaconsfield urged Parliament to send an expedition to Gallipoli to secure the Dardanelles. His demand was not heeded, however, because the Russians, unsuccessful in the Black Sea where the Turkish fleet was vastly superior, had been stopped at Plevna after a series of land victories in the Balkans. Rumania now joined Russia, and, in December, Plevna fell, and the Russians arrived in Adrianople. Immediately the Sultan appealed to England who now feared that the Dardanelles might fall under Russian control. The British fleet consequently advanced to the Sea of Marmora to wait outside the Straits for any move on the part of the Slavs towards Constantinople.



The results of all these diplomatic maneuvers amounted to nought as far as ending the war and settling the matter of the Straits were concerned, because Russia refused to make a pledge concerning the Dardanelles, and, therefore, England's policy continued to be one of conditional and vigilant neutrality.

England turned now to Austria in an attempt to come to an agreement and to get her to sign a protocol. She argued that Austrian coöperation was necessary to keep the peace, for by it the Russians could be prevented from going to Constantinople. But Andrassy refused to sign a protocol because he said he had told Russia that he would not act dishonestly toward her by entering an agreement with a third power. He recommended that each Power should maintain its interests by diplomatic means as need should arise, without calling on the other Power. But if any one of their mutual interests should be endangered, they could then come to an understanding concerning the combined action they should take.

Both Derby and Andrassy made it very clear that any Russian occupation of the Straits and permanent occupation of Constantinople would be considered just causes for war.

Although there was no signed agreement made between Austria and England, these negotiations, when considered along with the Anglo-Russian exchanges, resulted practically in the three power agreement that Gortchakov had been seeking. They also showed Russia that the time had not yet come for her to control the long coveted Dardanelles. The failure of England



to gain Austria as an active ally served to prove that Andrassy was under some one else's influence - that of Bismarck. In the midst of the siege of Plevna, the Turks had asked for mediation and now, on the last day of January 1878, at Adrianople, an armistice was concluded, in the last article of which the Porte agreed to safeguard the rights and interests of Russia in the (1)  
 "Détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles".

Neither Great Britain nor Austria liked the conditions of the Armistice, and Greece complicated the situation by declaring war on Turkey in February, but a united protest of the Powers squelched this move. It was evident that a European Conference was necessary to make a definite end to the war. Andrassy of Austria suggested a meeting at Vienna, and though Gortchakov agreed, Russia and Turkey signed the Treaty of San Stefano on March 3rd regardless of the interests of the other Powers. The large indemnity demanded, the territorial and governmental changes in Bulgaria, Montenegro, Roumania, Serbia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina if fulfilled would have practically excluded Turkey from Europe. Article XXIII renewed all treaties between the two parties while Article XXIV of the treaty directly concerned the Straits: "Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles resteront ouverts, en temps de guerre comme en temps de paix, aux navires marchands des Etats neutres, arrivant des ports russes ou en destination de ces ports. La Sublime Porte s'engage en conséquence à ne plus établir dorénavant, devant

(1) Noradounghian Vol. III, p. 507



The first part of the paper is devoted to a general discussion of the problem of the origin of life. It is shown that the problem is not only a scientific one, but also a philosophical one. The scientific aspect of the problem is concerned with the question of how life arose from non-life. The philosophical aspect is concerned with the question of whether life is a necessary part of the universe or whether it is a mere accident.

The second part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the various theories of the origin of life. These theories are divided into two main groups: the theory of spontaneous generation and the theory of biogenesis. The theory of spontaneous generation is the older of the two and is based on the idea that life can arise from non-life. The theory of biogenesis is the newer of the two and is based on the idea that life can only arise from life.

The third part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the evidence for and against the theory of spontaneous generation. It is shown that there is a great deal of evidence in favor of the theory of spontaneous generation, but that there is also a great deal of evidence against it. The evidence in favor of the theory of spontaneous generation is based on the fact that life has been found to arise from non-life in a number of cases. The evidence against the theory of spontaneous generation is based on the fact that life has never been found to arise from non-life in a single case.

The fourth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the evidence for and against the theory of biogenesis. It is shown that there is a great deal of evidence in favor of the theory of biogenesis, but that there is also a great deal of evidence against it. The evidence in favor of the theory of biogenesis is based on the fact that life has never been found to arise from non-life in a single case. The evidence against the theory of biogenesis is based on the fact that life has been found to arise from non-life in a number of cases.

The fifth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the various experiments that have been conducted to test the theory of spontaneous generation. These experiments are divided into two main groups: the experiments of Redi and the experiments of Pasteur. The experiments of Redi were conducted in 1668 and were designed to test the theory of spontaneous generation. The experiments of Pasteur were conducted in 1861 and were designed to test the theory of biogenesis.

The sixth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the various experiments that have been conducted to test the theory of biogenesis. These experiments are divided into two main groups: the experiments of Miescher and the experiments of Haeckel. The experiments of Miescher were conducted in 1828 and were designed to test the theory of biogenesis. The experiments of Haeckel were conducted in 1858 and were designed to test the theory of biogenesis.

The seventh part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the various experiments that have been conducted to test the theory of the origin of life. These experiments are divided into two main groups: the experiments of Miller and the experiments of Fox. The experiments of Miller were conducted in 1953 and were designed to test the theory of the origin of life. The experiments of Fox were conducted in 1961 and were designed to test the theory of the origin of life.

The eighth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the various experiments that have been conducted to test the theory of the origin of life. These experiments are divided into two main groups: the experiments of Orgel and the experiments of Crick. The experiments of Orgel were conducted in 1968 and were designed to test the theory of the origin of life. The experiments of Crick were conducted in 1971 and were designed to test the theory of the origin of life.

The ninth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the various experiments that have been conducted to test the theory of the origin of life. These experiments are divided into two main groups: the experiments of Orgel and the experiments of Crick. The experiments of Orgel were conducted in 1968 and were designed to test the theory of the origin of life. The experiments of Crick were conducted in 1971 and were designed to test the theory of the origin of life.



les ports de la mer Noire et de celle d'Azow, un blocus fictif qui s'écarterait de l'esprit de la Déclaration signée à Paris (1) le 4-16 Avril 1856".

When England and Austria learned of the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano they both prepared for war. On April 1st Lord Salisbury, who was now at the helm of the Foreign Office, issued a circular denouncing the treaty because it conflicted with British interests, contradicted existing international agreements and declarations, and gave Russia an undue preponderance in the East. He added that England would not take part in the proposed congress unless the entire Treaty of San Stefano be submitted for discussion. Russia refused to be humbled and commanded by Britain but agreed that all questions raised should be discussed provided she was not summoned before a Congress whose decisions she was bound to accept.

Bismarck formulated the plan for the Congress and proposed to the Powers who had signed the treaties of 1856 and 1871 that they discuss the Treaty of San Stefano. Shuvalov having stated that the Tsar had no intention of extending his conquests in Asia beyond Batoum and Kars, and in Europe beyond those limits prescribed by the treaty under discussion, England agreed not to contest these acquisitions. Whereupon Salisbury and Shuvalov signed three memoranda: the first defined the territorial changes accepted by Great Britain; the second, among other matters, reserved to the British Government the right to discuss at the Congress all questions touching the

(1) Noradounghian Vol. III, p. 519

The first part of the paper discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It is essential for the business to have a clear and concise record of all income and expenses. This will allow the business to track its financial performance over time and identify areas for improvement. The second part of the paper discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all assets and liabilities. This will allow the business to track its net worth over time and identify areas for improvement. The third part of the paper discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all debts and obligations. This will allow the business to track its financial obligations over time and identify areas for improvement. The fourth part of the paper discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all taxes and other legal obligations. This will allow the business to track its financial obligations over time and identify areas for improvement. The fifth part of the paper discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all other financial information. This will allow the business to track its financial performance over time and identify areas for improvement.

Straits and declared that Russia agreed to accept the status quo in regard to the Straits thereby renouncing the claim for the passage of the Straits by her warships. The third memorandum contained the word of Shuvalov as to the limits of Russian acquisitions under the Treaty of San Stefano.

Previous to the meeting of the Congress England and Turkey entered into a secret alliance by which England agreed to protect the Asiatic provinces of the Sultan if Russia acquired Batoum, Ardahan, and Kars, while the Porte promised to introduce reforms into Asia Minor and to allow Great Britain to occupy and administer Cyprus.

The Congress convened on June 13th at Berlin and sat for one month. In the twenty sittings held there were many long and arduous debates in which Russia and England <sup>(1)</sup> always conflicted. In fact it was the age old stand in the Eastern Question: Russia against the rest of Europe which feared her control of the Straits. Austria naturally sided with England, France and Italy usually did, while Germany, much to Gortchakov's surprise, turned from Russia and nearly always sided with England. Russia was astounded and henceforth spoke of her "humiliation <sup>(2)</sup> by Bismarck". An agreement was finally concluded and embodied in the Treaty of Berlin on July 13th which thoroughly transformed the Treaty of San Stefano.

(1) England's attitude was exemplified by Salisbury in a letter to Lord Russell in the spring of 1878, in which he said - "We object to Russia under the mask either of Slav or Turk dominating on the coasts, -----, where we have now friends, clients, and interests." from "Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury" by Lady Cecil p. 239

(2) Ludwig, Emil "Bismarck" p. 521



The greater part of the treaty dealt with the Balkans situation but Article 63 concerned the Dardanelles and it did nothing more than confirm the status quo as set forth in the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and that of London in 1871.

Thus all the diplomatic maneuvers were futile, for matters concerning the Dardanelles remained in the same unsatisfactory state which all Europe realized was temporary. The question was important enough at this time to be listed as one of the main causes for the Russo-Turkish war because Turkey never would have had the courage to bear arms against Russia if she did not have the support of England, who favored the Turk because she feared for her trade to India if Russia gained control of the Straits. The last mentioned country doubtlessly was aiming at modifying the rule of the Straits so that foreign warships would be excluded therefrom, while she would be able to secure the passage of her own warships by means of an arrangement with the Sultan. Consequently her reaction to the unrest in the Balkans was supported by national, as well as racial and religious aims.







CHAPTER VII  
From the Treaty of Berlin  
Through the World War

The twenty years following the Treaty of Berlin were marked by no obvious interest in the question of the Straits by any of the European countries. However, that it was constantly in the minds of all the statesmen is evident from the insertion of it into several agreements between nations in the next two decades.

In 1881, Russia, Austria, and Germany signed a treaty forming the League of the Three Emperors, which was to consolidate the general peace of Europe. In Article III, the three countries reaffirmed the principle of the closing of the Straits. It read thus: "The three Courts recognize the European and mutually obligatory character of the principle of the closing of the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles, founded on international law, confirmed by treaties, and summed up in the declaration of the second Plenipotentiary of Russia at the session of July 12 of the Congress of Berlin.

They will take care in common that Turkey shall make no exception to this rule in favor of the interests of any Government whatsoever, by lending to warlike operations of a belligerent Power the portion of its Empire constituted by the Straits.

In case of infringement, or to prevent it if such infringement should be in prospect, the three Courts will inform Turkey that they would regard her, in that event, as putting



herself in a state of war towards the injured Party, and as having deprived herself thenceforth of the benefits of the security assured to her territorial status quo by the Treaty of Berlin.<sup>(1)</sup> This treaty was renewed in 1884.

The Dreikaiserbund expired in 1887 and Alexander III, due to trouble in the Balkans between Austria and Russia, refused to renew it. However, Bismarck was anxious to keep in touch with Russia and signed a secret treaty known as the Reinsurance Treaty.<sup>(2)</sup> In Article III the two countries repeated Article III of the treaty of 1881 between Russia, Austria, and Germany.

In January, 1883, was founded the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy, which was renewed on March 13, 1887. To this renewal there was added a secret annex which included among its eight points the recognition of the "Independence of Turkey, trustee of important European interests (independence of the Caliphate, freedom of the Straits, etc.) of all preponderating foreign influence".<sup>(3)</sup>

(4)

It is to be noted that up to this time, Germany having no vital interest in the Straits, had paid little attention to the question.<sup>(5)</sup> Bismarck had allowed mention of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles in German treaties with other countries only as

(1) Cooke and Stickney "Readings In European International Relations" p. 5

(2) Ibid p. 22

(3) Ibid p. 24

(4) The last decade of the nineteenth century

(5) Driault "La reprise de Constantinople" p. 18

"----l'Allemagne n'avait aucune situation dans ces regions, donc aucun droit à y faire valoir, aucune traditions à y poursuivre; elle y venait heurter toutes les traditions, sans raucines dans le passe, quelque chose ainsi d'anormal, ou, comme on dit en biologie, de monstrueux."





a means to securing Germany's desires in other questions. His policy in the crisis of 1878, was, as we have seen, purposefully vague, and his note added to the secret annex of the Triple Alliance of 1887 confirms the general belief that it was Bismarck's intention not to involve Germany in the question of the Straits. This note read: "It is not to our interest to fight for the program and equally so not to oppose it. We can fight only for Germany's interests, and they are not concerned here".

With the fall of Bismarck in 1890 there was so much pressure brought to bear on Kaiser Wilhelm II that the German Empire definitely entered the question of the Straits. In 1891, Hatzfeld, who had been the German Ambassador in Turkey after the Treaty of Berlin, advised the Kaiser to pay a ceremonial visit to the Sultan. Hatzfeld knew that fear and hate of Russia governed Turkish foreign policy, that England had lost almost every shred of what popularity survived her occupation of Cyprus by her occupation of Egypt, and that France was regarded as a decadent nation. From the Turkish point of view German friendship was worth great sacrifices, because to curb the ambitions of the Balkan states, the Ottoman Empire had to rely on Austria over which country Germany could exercise a check. Besides this political reason, there was the economic side to the story. A group of German capitalists owned the trunk railway on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus. They

(1) p. 72

(2) Cooke and Stickney p. 24





encouraged the government to ally itself with the Porte so that their interests might be protected. Henceforth, Germany plays the same part in Turkish foreign policy that France played in the early eighteenth century, and that Russia attempted to play at Unkiar-Skelessi.

Of the other Powers, France played a defensive game, and welcomed a German policy which must antagonize Russia. Italy watched, but was not strong enough until 1910 to follow an independent policy. However, in 1909 in a Russo-Italian accord, she agreed to consider the Russian interests in the question of the Straits. England remained indifferent, assuming a conciliatory and humanitarian policy until the growth of the German Navy frightened her into taking a livelier interest in Near Eastern affairs.

Russia watched the progress of German influence with disquiet, although the ingratitude of Bulgaria and the increasing diversion of her energy to the Far East compelled her to place the question of Constantinople and the Straits second in line. However, in 1896, when the massacre of Armenians spread to Constantinople and aroused intense indignation in England and to a less degree in France and Italy, the Tsar's Government made it clear that a Western naval demonstration before Constantinople would be regarded as a menace to Russian interests. The Turks, however, showed no great sign of gratitude for this service.



In 1897 came the war with Greece in which the German tutors of the Turkish army acquired fresh prestige at Constantinople. In 1898 a long list of events led the rest of Europe to feel certain that the Kaiser was determined to play the part of the Western ally and protector to the Ottoman. Turkey conceded the port of Haider Pasha to the German Anatolian Railways Company. The Kaiser visited the Sultan and the Holy Land. The question of the Straits became an issue of the highest importance to German commercial and military policy, for the Bosphorus and Dardanelles were bridges on the road that was to bring German influence down to the Persian Gulf and to turn aside the British sea-power by Turco-German railway power, and to unite Pan-Islamism and Germany's military power. The great plan failed, Pan-Islamism proved less formidable than the Kaiser had hoped and the British had feared, since Persians, Arabs, Egyptians and even Turks were more infected by nationalism than any European suspected, and were therefore unwilling to coöperate for the doubtful benefit of Islam and the certain profit of the Kaiser. But this threat to the British Empire in the East was more serious than Napoleon's. To Russia the change was less threatening. Even if the Turkish bridge remained in pro-German hands, the Russian Government might hope to cut off the eastern road in the Balkans, and in the last resort might even win Constantinople. In any case the Russians believed that they could afford to wait, and could, in the meantime, win fresh realms in the Far East. German diplomacy encouraged this belief.



In 1895 the Russian Government, desiring to despatch warships from the Black Sea for service in the Pacific, announced that in the future "it would come to an arrangement with the Sultan alone in regard to the conditions of passage for her war-vessels"<sup>(1)</sup>. The British Government objected, insisting that it was the duty of the Tsar's Government to obtain the consent of all the Powers which had signed the Treaty of London. In the same year, the fear of an anti-Christian outbreak at Constantinople led the Six Powers to demand the Porte's authorization of the passage of the Straits by light vessels and their entry into the Golden Horn. After long negotiations the Turkish Government agreed to the temporary and provisional authorization of the entry of an additional light vessel representing each Power, subject to the recognized limitation of tonnage.

In an Austro-Russian agreement of 1897 which formed the basis of Austro-Russian policy in the Balkans up to 1908, the two countries recognized that the question of the Straits had an eminently European character, and, therefore, could not be made the object of a separate understanding between Austria-Hungary and Russia.

In 1898 there arose a complication when the Bulgarian Government, which had ordered a torpedo-gunboat in France, asked for permission to send this ship through the Straits to the Black Sea ports of the Principality. The Porte at first refused to grant permission, maintaining that Bulgaria

(1) Phillipson and Buxton - p. 163







had no right to possess warships, and that her naval defense was assured by the Ottoman fleet. Since in reality, the Ottoman fleet had been so scandalously neglected as to be almost inactive and could protect nobody, the Bulgarians did not relish the prospect that their only warships would be prevented from entering Bulgarian waters. In the end the matter was settled in their favor by the good offices of the Powers.

In the autumn of 1902 the Sultan allowed four torpedo-boats of the Russian Mediterranean squadron to enter the Black Sea for the naval review at Livadia, but on condition that they should pass the Straits under the mercantile flag, without armament or full crews and at intervals of twenty-four hours. In January 1903, the British Ambassador at Constantinople protested to the Porte against the granting of this authorization, describing it as an infringement of the Treaty of London, and declared that his Government reserved the right to claim the same privilege. The German press seized the opportunity to attack the British claims, and the English press responded by prophesying a German alliance with Russia in any Russo-British controversy. The secret of Russian demand and German sympathy was the desire of the Tsar to obtain a precedent for the passage of its vessels into the Mediterranean for eventual use in the China Seas, and the German wish to assist Russia in entangling herself in the Far East. The most interesting feature of this incident was the changeabout in the policies of Great Britain and Russia. At Berlin Lord Salisbury had declared that



British engagements on the subject of the Straits were not "of a general European or international character, but were engagements towards the Sultan only," while Count Shuvalov maintained that the rule of the Straits was based upon the joint agreement of the six Signatory Powers. In 1903 the Russians defended Lord Salisbury's position, and the Marquis of Lansdowne defended Count Shuvalov's<sup>(1)</sup>!

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 once more raised the question of the passage of the Straits by warships. The Black Sea fleet, which might have given the Russians the victory at Tsushima, remained imprisoned by the Treaty of London. In the summer of 1904, two vessels of the Russian Volunteer Fleet passed through the Straits from the Black Sea under the Russian mercantile flag, and entered the Red Sea from Port Said. These and the other ships of the Volunteer Fleet served in peace-time both as merchantmen and as Government transports; they were commanded by naval officers who bore the Tsar's commission, and were notoriously used as auxiliary cruisers in time of war. In 1891 the Russian Government and the Porte had agreed that ships of the Volunteer Fleet might not pass through the Straits with military material on board and with crews on a war footing. Now these two vessels, when they had entered the Red Sea had hoisted the naval flag, mounted guns which they had carried from Sebastopol and seized vessels on the charge of carrying contraband of war. Their capture of the S. S. Malacca in July of 1904 aroused a British protest on the ground that if the

(1) Graves, Philip p. 137



captor was a warship, the Russian Government had violated existing treaties by sending men-of-war through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles without the necessary permission of the Porte. If, on the other hand, the captor was a merchantman, her commander had broken that principle of International Law whereby belligerent operations can only be carried out by properly commissioned warships. In the end the Russian Government revoked the commissions of these two vessels.

Attention was again attracted to the Straits by events in Southern Russia. During the revolution of 1905, the crew of one of the battleships mutinied and put to sea from Sebastopol. Their action caused great alarm at Constantinople, but the crew did not attempt the Bosphorus, and soon surrendered to the Rumanians.

The whole series of incidents, which have just been reviewed, confirmed the impression that the Treaty of London had failed. By entitling the Sultan to open the Straits at his discretion to the warships of friendly and allied Powers, in case he deemed it necessary in order to secure the execution of the Treaty of Paris, decisions of international importance were left to the arbitrary discretion of Turkey acting alone or inspired by another Power which might have acquired a strong diplomatic position at Constantinople. It thus increased the rivalry between the Powers as to which could exert the most influence over the Sultan, and finally led to the control of the Straits by one Government - Germany.







Driven back to her former field of activity by her failure in the Far East, Russia occupied the years 1906-12 in attempting to counter the Austro-Hungarian political penetration of the Balkans. The Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 which ended the rivalry between the British and Russian Empires in Asia, was to lead before long to a fundamental change in the British attitude toward the question of the Straits, although German naval rivalry was the principal cause of this change. A secondary cause was the growth of Austro-Hungarian naval power, and the doubt that persisted as to the attitude of Italy in the event of hostilities between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. The British fleet was increasingly concentrated in northern waters. Meanwhile British insistence on the reform of Turkish administration in Macedonia, though it was inspired by a common sense desire to remove a cause of international strife by pacifying a land exposed to the conflicting ambitions of great and lesser Powers, gave German diplomacy a further advantage at Constantinople.

On July 2, 1908, the Russian Foreign Minister, Izvolski, while accepting the Turkish concessions to Austria for a railway, announced that he was ready to discuss changes, such as the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Sanjak by Austria in return for the opening of the Straits to Russian warships. The Young Turk Revolution of this same month provided the opportunity for carrying out this suggestion. In August the Austrian Foreign Minister, Aehrenthal, secured the

The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work during the year. It is followed by a detailed account of the various projects and the results achieved. The report concludes with a summary of the work done and the plans for the future.

The second part of the report deals with the financial aspects of the work. It gives a detailed account of the income and expenditure for the year and shows how the funds have been used. It also includes a statement of the assets and liabilities of the organization at the end of the year.

The third part of the report deals with the personnel of the organization. It gives a list of the staff and their duties and also a list of the volunteers who have helped in the work. It also includes a statement of the training and development of the staff.

The fourth part of the report deals with the public relations of the organization. It gives a list of the public relations activities carried out during the year and also a list of the media coverage of the organization's work. It also includes a statement of the public opinion of the organization's work.

The fifth part of the report deals with the future plans of the organization. It gives a list of the projects and activities planned for the next year and also a list of the resources required for their completion. It also includes a statement of the objectives of the organization for the next year.

consent of his allies, Germany and Italy, to the proposal, and met Izvolski at Buchlau in Bohemia. As a result, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina the next October and announced the evacuation of Sanjak. Izvolski declared Aehrenthal had acted without his knowledge, and insisted upon a conference to ratify the action, hoping to secure compensations for Russia at the same time. He therefore went to London to gain (1) British consent to this plan. Grey agreed that changes in the Treaty of Berlin required the agreement of all signatories, but he made it plain that the question of the Straits must not be raised at the conference. As time went on, the idea of a conference lapsed, and Austria paid Turkey monetary compensation. Russia was deeply humiliated.

Western liberals had hoped that the Turkish Revolution might bring a change in foreign policy. But they were quickly disillusioned, for by 1910 the Young Turk politicians were nearly as pro-German as the Young Turk soldiers. The strong Jewish element in the Committee of Union and Progress, the party governing Turkey, was anti-Russian, and was allied with the Jewish capitalists and press of Germany and Austria-Hungary. However, the Russian Government made a serious attempt in 1911 to obtain concessions on the subject of the Straits from the new régime. In the fall of that year, war broke out between Italy and the Porte. The Italian Government threatened to blockade the Dardanelles. Late in November, Tcharykov, the Russian Ambassador, while conversing with the Grand Vizier and

(1) Despatch from Grey to Nicholson "Twenty-five Years 1892-1916" Vol. I, p. 176-179 Found also in British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914 Vol. V, #379





the Foreign Minister, suggested the opening of the Straits to Russian warships. The Turks replied that they would not negotiate without the concurrence of the other Signatories of the Treaty of Berlin, and added that even if these Powers consented to the change in the rule of the Straits, the Ottoman Government was not prepared to consent. On December 4th the Russian Ambassador delivered a note from his Government to the Sublime Porte. The note claimed "liberty of passage for Russian warships, while maintaining the old principle of exclusion for the warships of other foreign States"<sup>(1)</sup>. The Porte replied to the note in an emphatic negative, and said that the acceptance of the Russian proposals would be equal to the acceptance of a Russian Protectorate. The British and French Governments, which previously had been sounded by Russia, informed the Porte that they would consent to the proposed departure from the Rule of the Straits, if the Porte agreed to it; if it did not agree, they would not exercise any pressure on Turkey. The German and Austrian Governments, on the other hand, opposed any change in the Rule, and urged the Porte to refuse the Russian proposals. The rejection of Russia's proposal by Turkey convinced the former that the Porte was in close diplomatic relations with the Central Powers, and it was not surprising, therefore, that in the next year Russia encouraged the Balkan Alliance at which they might otherwise have looked askance.

The Italian war dragged on. Italian demonstrations at the mouth of the Dardanelles led the Turks to declare the

(1) Phillipson and Buxton p. 190





Dardanelles closed to all shipping, but after a month they were opened in deference to a Russian protest. The Italians did not repeat the attack but turned their attention in another direction. The war ended on October 18th, 1912; and as it ended, the first Balkan War began.

By 1914, as a result of the Balkan Wars, Turkey had been left with only a small region around Constantinople as the remnant of her former large Empire in Europe. In this study, we have no particular interest in these Balkan Wars, but three points are to be noted: "1. When the Bulgarian army had reached the Chatalja lines, the Porte, by encouraging rumors that before the Turks left Constantinople they would drown the city in Christian blood, caused the Six Powers, Spain, Holland, and Rumania, to demand and obtain permission to send warships to Constantinople for the protection of their subjects. 2. Before peace was negotiated in London after the first war, the Bulgars appear to have been warned by Russia not to claim Rodosto, on the Sea of Marmora, but to content themselves with Thrace, west of the Enos-Midia line. 3. The Greeks won the islands of Samothrace and also Lemnos, with its fine harbor of Mudros, which gave them a most advantageous naval position against the Turks. They remained, moreover, in occupation of the isles of Imbros and Tenedos, pending the settlement of the ownership of the islands of Chios and Mitylene which the Turks had only ceded under protest, and with the intention of making war on Greece as soon as their dreadnoughts were completed by



British ship builders. The second Balkan War, in which Bulgaria fought her allies and was beaten while the Turks reoccupied Adrianople, was a sore disappointment for Russian diplomacy. Bulgaria's exasperation made her the potential ally of the Austro-Hungarian Empire against the Serbs, and of Turkey against the Greeks".<sup>(1)</sup>

From the autumn of 1913, German influence at Constantinople grew stronger. Late in that year General Liman von Sanders was sent to Constantinople by the German Government as military adviser to the Turkish Government and was appointed to the command over the Metropolitan Army Corps, which included the forts of the Bosphorus. The Russian Government protested and was supported by France and Great Britain. The Porte agreed to give Liman the appointment of Inspector General of the First Army; but the warning confirmed Russian fears, and stimulated Russian military and naval preparations. On the advice of Sazonov, the Tsar appointed a committee to prepare a program of action which, if necessary, would defend Russian interests at the Straits.<sup>(2)</sup>

It was only natural that Russia should have such a fear of German control of the Turkish masters of the Straits, for it meant a permanent threat to her huge commerce built up by two centuries of hard labor in her Southlands. Turkey, on the other hand, welcomed the Kaiser's friendship, for he governed the strongest Continental State, and Russia was the Turk's national enemy.

(1) Graves pp. 142-3

(2) There is an excellent collection of the diplomatic correspondence relating to this incident in Cooke and Stickney pp. 267-279





In June 1914 the Russian Government made another attempt to improve its position. The Tsar made a visit to the King of Rumania, after which both countries presented similar notes to the Porte, pointing out the disadvantages caused by the temporary closing of the Straits to foreign merchantmen during the Italian and Balkan Wars.

The Great War broke in the Balkans, in June of 1914, and by August, the five Great Powers, Belgium and Serbia were at war; Turkey was mobilizing and had signed a Treaty of Alliance with Germany. <sup>(1)</sup> Great indignation was caused when it was heard that the British Government had laid hands, as it was entitled to do, on the Turkish dreadnoughts preparing for the sea in England. On August 10th, two German cruisers, the "Goeben" and "Breslau", fleeing from British pursuit, took refuge in the Dardanelles. The next day it was announced that they had been purchased by Turkey. Three days later, the officers of the British Naval Mission in Turkey were removed from their executive command. Mines were laid in the Dardanelles, Germans began to reach Turkey by rail through Bulgaria, and the German crews of the "purchased warships" stayed on board. Late in September the Dardanelles were closed to merchant shipping; the "Goeben" and "Breslau" began to cruise in the Black Sea with Turkish flags and German crews; the influx of German sailors and soldiers continued; while the Grand Vizier, practically the prisoner of the pro-German faction of the Committee of Union and Progress, still spoke of Turkish neutrality to the

(1) Text of this treaty is in Cooke and Stickney p. 407





protesting Ministers of the Entente. On the night of October 27th the German ships and the Turkish fleet under Admiral Souchon entered the Black Sea. Two days later they raided Odessa and Theodosia, and sank two small Russian men-of-war. By the twelfth of November Turkey was at war with the allies.<sup>(1)</sup>

The entry of the Turks into the Great War on the side of the Central Powers gave Russia the chance for which she had waited for generations. The Tsar's Government rapidly made up its mind to secure the consent of France and Great Britain to the contingent annexation of Constantinople and the areas about the Straits. Before Turkey declared war, but when her Government clearly intended to join Germany, Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, appears to have suggested a combination of internationalization and earlier Russian proposals as a solution of the problem of the Straits. After the Turkish attack on Odessa and Theodosia, however, there was a natural desire among the Russians for larger concessions, and while the French Government was at first unwilling to express its opinion, the British were in favor of satisfying the Russian ambitions. No time was lost in opening negotiations, for the soldiers were beginning to foresee the effects of closing the Straits on the Russian supply of arms and munitions, and grew still more anxious when the Turks in unexpected strength began to invade Transcaucasia. So, when the Russian General Staff raised the question of an Anglo-French attack upon the Straits,

(1) The "Goeben" and Breslau" affair and the closing of the Dardanelles were two of the reasons that the commission created by the Preliminary Peace Conference of 1919 gave for placing part of the responsibility for the War on Turkey.



the Government pressed harder for the early acceptance of its demands before the expedition landed, and at the same time deprecated any attempt on the part of the Western allies to bring Greece over to their side. Russia feared that her allies, if they reached Constantinople first, would propose a solution of the question of the Straits falling far short of Russian hopes, unless she had previously bound them by formal engagements. The Greeks, whom the Russian people distrusted as much as did Nicholas, would in that case merely complicate the situation. The Allies, on the other hand, were afraid that without some assurance as to Constantinople, Russia might sign a separate peace.

On March 4, 1915 the Minister of Foreign Affairs handed a memorandum to the British and French Ambassadors, setting forth the territorial claims of Russia in event of success in the war. They were defined as follows:

"The town of Constantinople, the western coast of the Bosphorus, of the Sea of Marmora and of the Dardanelles; southern Thrace as far as the Enos-Midia line; the coast of Asia Minor, between the Bosphorus and the river Sakaria, and a point on the Gulf of Ismid to be defined later; the islands in the Sea of Marmora and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. The special rights of England and France in the above territories shall remain inviolate"<sup>(1)</sup>.

The memorandum went on to say that both the British and French Governments expressed their willingness to agree to the

(1) Graves p. 153

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wishes of the Russian Government in event of victory, provided that a number of British and French claims in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere were satisfied.

The case for accepting the Russian claim to the Straits was so strong that the British Government had to reverse its ancient policy, to which it had been less attached since German sea-power had become threatening. The French, after their alliance with Russia, were less opposed to the opening of the Straits to the Russian warships, since the addition of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to their Mediterranean squadron would place them in a position of undisputed superiority to the Austro-Hungarian and Italian Fleets. Both obtained guarantees for their economic interests in Turkey, and the British secured an extension of their sphere of interest in Persia.<sup>(1)</sup>

It was not until the winter of 1916-17 that the existence of this Straits Agreement was officially made known. Its maintenance had become an issue of Russian internal policy, since the reactionaries, fearing that revolution would break out if the war continued, hinted that England never intended to let Russia have the Straits. In March 1916, Milyukov declared in the Duma that though Russia did not begin the war for the Straits and Constantinople, she would not end it without them. The debates in the Duma led to questions in the House of Commons which the British Foreign Secretary had to answer evasively, and he therefore raised the question of publishing the agreement as a means of fighting propaganda and Russian defeatism.

(1) A secret treaty was signed by England, France, and Russia guaranteeing each other's rights in Constantinople, the Straits, and Persia.





The British Government communicated with the Tsar, saying that it would stand by the Straits Agreement and urged him not to let his nation be led away by hostile intrigues. Nicholas answered that he was in favor of an official declaration by his Government, announcing that the Allies regarded the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia as an immutable condition of peace. Rumania, who had finally joined the Entente, was informed of the agreement, and assured that she would be guaranteed free passage through the Straits for her ships; and on December 2, 1916 the Russian Prime Minister, Trepov, made a statement before the Duma. Russia had struggled for a thousand years for a free passage through the Straits. Turkey had attacked her, and in 1915 Great Britain and France, joined later by Italy, had agreed that Constantinople and the Straits should fall to Russia. On Christmas the Tsar issued a message to his army, in which he described the acquisition of Constantinople and the Straits as one of the war aims of the country which must be achieved before peace was made. The declaration fell flat, for Russia had lost heart.

Milyukov became Foreign Minister under the Provisional Government set up after the Revolution of March 1917. He advocated the acquisition of Constantinople, and hoped to continue the policy of Sazonov. But the statement of the Prime Minister, Kerensky, that Russia did not need the Straits but would agree to their internationalization, provided that she obtained a free passage to the Mediterranean, confused the



situation. Milyukov and the General Staff appear to have been discussing an expedition against the Bosphorus, when the enterprise was vetoed by the War Minister, and the increasing pressure of the Soviet of Soldiers and Workmen and of the politicians attracted by the slogan "No annexations and no indemnities", made confusion worse, and finally drove Milyukov to resign. His successor, Tereshchenko, followed Kerensky's ideas, and Kerensky, in May 1917, advocated a peace on the basis of the self-determination of nations, without annexations and without indemnities. Two months later, the army began to break up under the promptings of the Bolsheviks within and the pressure of the Austro-German armies. The Government proposed an inter-allied conference, with the object of revising the Secret Treaties; but on November 7, 1917, the day when the Foreign Minister was to leave for Paris, the Bolshevik revolution broke out, and Russia went down in bloodshed and civil war.

On June 11, 1917, King Constantine of Greece had been forced to abdicate by the British and French Governments, and henceforth Greece followed Venizelos. The Greek people slowly realized that Constantinople might not be lost after all, and they joined in the war on the side of the Entente. Their alliance turned the scale in the Balkans; the battle of the Vardar drove Bulgaria out of the war; the Greek troops were marching on Constantinople, when the Turks heavily defeated in Palestine and cut off from their German Allies threw themselves on the mercy of the victors. On November 9, 1918, British troops



occupied the forts by the Dardanelles, thus placing that water-way in Christian hands for the first time in more than five and a half centuries. Four days later the Allies were in possession of the capital.





## CONCLUSION After the War

The year 1916-1917 was one of peace negotiations. In the several suggestions made we find Austria ready to make a secret armistice with Russia provided that the question of Constantinople were not made an issue, while the Allies demanded that the Straits be free and open in the future. It was rumored that Russia attempted to make a separate peace with the Central Powers agreeing to ask nothing of Austria-Hungary and to restore all occupied territories to Germany, provided that the latter would agree that the Dardanelles and a strip of land on either side would be neutralized under the control of a sovereign international commission in which all maritime states should be represented, with a double representation for those states having territory on the Black Sea.

None of these proposals were followed up by any action until January 1918 when Wilson put into definite form several conditions of peace that had been left vague by others. The twelfth of the fourteen points which he outlined read: "The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees".

(1) Cooke and Stickney p. 550



International control of the navigation of these waterways was clearly desirable, but schemes for the internationalization of the Government of Constantinople and the zone of the Straits presented innumerable difficulties. It was easy to talk of a "Free City of Constantinople", or of a "Neutral territory of the Straits", under the guarantee of the League of Nations; but how was the League, a new born institution, possessing no executive powers, incapable of exercising compulsion, to assume such grave responsibilities?

International jealousies prevented the suggestion that the "Mandate for Constantinople" should be assigned to one of the Great Powers of Europe. Neutral states would not accept the task; and the hope that the United States would agree to be the Mandatory for Turkey, or for any province or area detached from Turkey was speedily dispelled.

There remained two claimants to the City and the Straits, Turkey and Greece. The chance that the Great Powers would allow Turkey to retain her capital and its sea-gates seemed small indeed. The Greek claim was based on tradition and history.

Unfortunately for all concerned except the Turks, the victors were in no hurry to make peace in the Near East. It was not until the early summer of 1920 that the terms of the Treaty to be imposed upon Turkey were communicated to the Porte. The Treaty of Sèvres was based upon the assumption that the retention of the control over the Marmora Basin and the Straits by a single power, i. e. Turkey, was injurious to the general





interest. To that end Thrace, with the exception of the  
 (1)  
 Constantinople area within the Chatalja lines, was to be ceded  
 to Greece, which thus obtained the Gallipoli Peninsula. The  
 whole coastland of the Marmora, the adjoining territorial  
 waters, the islands within the Straits, and Lemnos, Imbros,  
 Tenedos, Samothrace, and Mitylene outside them were to form a  
 special zone within which the British, French, and Italian  
 Governments might alone maintain military, naval, or aerial  
 forces. With unimportant exceptions, no Greek or Turkish armed  
 forces could be maintained in this region. Article XXXVII  
 defined the freedom of the Straits as follows: "The navigation  
 of the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora,  
 and the Bosphorus, shall in future be open, both in peace and  
 war to every vessel of commerce or of war, and to military and  
 commercial aircraft, without distinction of flag. These waters  
 shall not be subject to blockade, nor shall any belligerent  
 right be exercised nor any act of hostility committed within  
 them unless in pursuance of a decision of the Council of the  
 (2)  
 League of Nations."

The Treaty set up a Commission of the Straits composed  
 of representatives of the Great Powers, excluding Germany, but  
 including the United States and Russia, should they join the  
 League, who would each have two votes, and those of Greece,  
 Rumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey who were to have one vote each.

(1) Article XXXVI recognized the rights and title of the  
 Turkish Government over Constantinople.

(2) Cooke and Stickney- Text of the Treaty of Sèvres p. 754





The Commission was to have the administrative control of the navigation of the Straits; its members were to enjoy diplomatic privileges; it was to have its own flag, budget, and water police.<sup>(1)</sup> By Article XLIV, the Commission was to inform the representatives of the three Powers at Constantinople - Great Britain, France and Italy - which were allowed to keep military establishments in the Straits, of any interference with the liberty of navigation within the area under control of the Commissioners. The representatives of these Powers would then take the necessary defensive measures in concert with the naval and military commands of their forces in the Propontis.

From the outset the Treaty of Sèvres was disliked by Italy and France, and was never ratified by Turkey who began to take steps to modify it. Her first move was in the Angora Agreement of 1921 with France, by which Turkey got back Alexandretta and Cilicia. She then recaptured Smyrna and threatened to take Constantinople. In the summer of 1922 the Greek armies of occupation in the Smyrna region were routed and the Allies were ready to make concessions. The Mudania armistice was signed permitting the Turkish Nationalists to retain Smyrna and to assume the administration of Constantinople. It was followed by a Peace Conference held at Lausanne. Attached to a treaty there drawn up was a Straits Convention. Its first article states that the signatories agree to recognize and declare the principle of the freedom of transit and navigation by sea and air through the Straits, which includes the Dardanelles, the

(1) Articles XXXVIII, XXXIX, and XL



Bosphorus, and the Sea of Marmora. Article II states that the rules governing the movements of commercial and military vessels and aircraft will be regulated by the provisions of an annex which states that, in time of war, Turkey being neutral, war vessels and military aircraft enjoy the same right of passage under the same limitations, which will not be applicable to any belligerent Power to the prejudice of its belligerent rights in the Black Sea. The military aircraft or warships of belligerents are forbidden to exercise their belligerent rights in the Straits if Turkey is neutral. In time of war, with Turkey a belligerent, neutral warships have equally complete freedom of passage, and neutral military aircraft may pass "at their own risk and peril", and will alight to submit to investigation of their character. The measures taken by Turkey to prevent enemy aircraft and warships from using the Straits must not be such as to prevent neutral vessels and aircraft of all categories from passing through the Straits, and Turkey agrees to provide such vessels and aircraft with "the necessary instructions or pilots" for that purpose.

Articles X-XVI provide for the establishment of an International Straits Commission carrying out its function under the supervision of the League of Nations to which it will report. The Commission is composed of representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Russia, Jugoslavia, and the United States, under the perpetual presidency of the Turkish representative.



No serious incident has troubled the Straits Commission since its formation but there remains in every one's mind the question: What will happen when Russia becomes a revived Power? When she is able to demand her rights, will she not ask for the closing of the Straits in war, and how will she secure such a change in the present rule?





## SUMMARY

The question of the Straits, as seen in the foregoing survey, has been one of world wide interest since the beginnings of history because of its economic as well as political aspect. The Trojans held the Straits until Athens gained control of the Black Sea route. In the Peloponnesian War, Sparta ended Athenian supremacy and became the lord of these parts, until after 330 A. D. when Byzantine authority over the Straits and Constantinople preserved the civilization of Europe.

To the medieval Italian trading cities, control of the Straits was a vital issue upon which rested their very means of existence. Of these Genoa gained supreme authority until Turkey became interested. She, by a gradual conquest that lasted for over a century, was able to seize the Dardanelles by 1356 and almost one hundred years later Constantinople, thus establishing her permanent control of the Straits. However, the states of western Europe were still able to pass through the Straits and navigate Turkish waters for commercial purposes because of a series of treaties, known as capitulations, which they made with the Porte.

At the end of the seventeenth century, Russia pressed southward and began to threaten the Turkish monopoly of the Black Sea. To gain an outlet for the production of the south was the object of the policy founded by Peter the Great and followed by his successors. Catherine II succeeded in inaugurating the modern phase of the Eastern question by ending the exclusive Turkish control of the Straits and the Black Sea in



the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardjii which opened them to merchant-ships flying the Russian flag.

The Western sea-powers, upon seeing this Russian activity, were aroused, and the question became more complicated economically and politically. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw a struggle between Russia and Western Europe for the control of a strategic position at the Straits. England played the part of the protector of the Ottoman Empire while France played her cards as she thought best in each particular situation. The height of Russian influence was marked by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi in 1833. All Europe became alarmed at the privileges granted herein to Russia, and consequently the diplomats of the day set out to cancell the advantages which Russia had thus acquired. They accomplished their purpose in the Treaty of London and the Convention of the Straits in 1841. This act served as one of the causes of the Crimean War which was settled by the Treaty of Paris in 1856 which humiliated Russia by neutralizing the Black Sea. Upon Russia's consequent denunciation of the Treaty of Paris the Powers met at London and signed the Treaty of London in 1871 which, although it left the rule as to the closing of the Straits the same as it was under the treaties of 1841 and 1856, it enabled Russia to build and maintain a fleet in the Black Sea and thus become once again a menace to Constantinople.

In the years 1871-1878, as a result of the trouble in the Balkans, there was much bickering between the Powers,



especially between England and Russia, over the question of the Straits. But all diplomatic maneuvers of the period were for nought, because the Treaty of Berlin confirmed the status quo set forth in the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and that of London in 1871.

The last years of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth were marked by several incidents which necessitated interpretations of the rule of the Straits. They ~~are~~<sup>were</sup> also marked by the more active interest in the question of the Straits upon the part of Germany who succeeded in becoming so influential at the Porte that Turkey joined the Central Powers in the World War, one side of which represented an international resistance to German control of this passage way to the East.

The defeat of Germany, the break-up of the Hapsburg realm and of the Ottoman Empire, and the change in the policy of Russia made the control of the whole Black Sea basin by any single Power, or even by any association of Powers, improbable, but the Straits may again be controlled in war time by a single Power or a group of Powers and there looms before us the possibility of a revived and able Soviet Russia with ambitions in the direction of the Straits.

The Freedom of the Straits is said to mean that "commerce should be able to count on a free passage through them, whether the riverain Power or Powers are at peace or at war."<sup>(1)</sup> Does

(1) Graves p. 202 A quotation from "History of the Peace Conference at Paris" Vol. VI, p. 60







the Treaty of Lausanne guarantee this freedom? The present settlement amounts to a partial internationalization of the Straits, which would most assuredly cease as soon as the Turkish Republic was engaged in war with a maritime Power. Turkey is at present pacifically inclined, but her future is uncertain. Her progress up to date has been largely the work of one great man - Ghazi. A weak or rash successor might involve Turkey in fresh conflicts, and a war which closed the Straits to neutral shipping would be disastrous to European trade.



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
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